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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
AHURI Fina l Report No. 22: Housing implicat ions of social, spat ial and structural 
change by Judy Yates i n 2002 charted changes in home o wnership in Australia ove r 
the turbulent period 1986-1996. This project covers the same ground over the decade  
of recovery 1996-2006. However, it extends the original methodology in several ways 
– the complications of market and urban economics, the  interaction of supply and 
demand, th e life cycle  determinants of tenure choice, an d the impa ct of risk o n 
financial regimes. 
This positioning paper provides a short summary of a series of t opics relating to t he 
broader economic and social context of changes in housing tenure. These are: 
Æ change in t he global and local economic situ ation; in pa rticular a major sea  
change in demand for capital and r esources, involving a reversal in the  long term 
decline in interest rates and demand for labour 
Æ expansion of money supply leading to a rapid increase in house prices an d record 
household debt 
Æ debt and financial market instability 
Æ changes in tenure in Australia 
Æ determinants of tenure choice and housing careers  
Æ tenure neutrality 
Æ changes in international policies relating to home ownership 
Æ fast and slow processes of demand and supply 
Æ rent gradients and changes in urban form and density. 
The paper d raws on lon gwave theory to distinguish the period 1986-1996 studied by 
Yates as part of a 30-year period of slow and erratic glo bal economic growth and 
financial turmoil which began around 1974. Fro m 2003 it is considered that a new era 
of steady global growth and tightening demand for resources has begun, in which the 
major concerns in the longer term will not be restructu ring, income inequality o r 
financial maneuvering, but real sho rtages of ho using, cap ital and labo ur. The stud y 
period 199 6-2006 is an interim period in w hich the n ew situatio n has become  
increasingly apparent, but policy has cont inued to refle ct the earlie r concerns –  
particularly in the light of the delayed major financial shakeout which began in 2008.  
Yates found that the major change in tenure from 1986-1996 was a rapid increase in 
housing eq uity due to the increa sing number of outright owners. This situat ion 
reversed after 1996 as the money supply expanded rapidly. Record h igh levels of  
household borrowing became apparent, causing house prices to rise well above long -
term equilibrium levels relative to both incomes and rents.  
A very significant, high ly countercyclica l growth in investor housing also became 
apparent from 1993, helping to fuel the house price bubble while increasing the supply 
of rental housing – possibly at the expense of owner-occupation for younger groups. 
However, tightening of the money supply in 2008 has caused a stabilisation in rental  
investment, which has been acco mpanied by a move o f first home buyers into  
medium density housing originally supported by the investment boom.  
From 1994, real personal incomes began to increase, thou gh the inco mes of the top  
group continued to rise more rapidly. In spatial terms, the boom areas were in Sydney 
and Perth, with non-metropolitan New South  Wales and Western Australia also  
staging a strong comeback from 1999. 
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 The Yates study was co nducted against a backd rop of financial distre ss following the 
boom of the late 1980 s, when a number of high-profile collapses o ccurred in t he 
financial sector post- deregulation. As a consequence, Australian financial  
organisations have bee n more circumspect th an their US  counterpart s in extending 
subprime finance to lower income e arners. However, a rang e of innovat ive financial 
productions and se curitisations has assisted a  fairly signif icant withdra wal of equity 
from owner-occupied housing for personal consumption and investment purposes.  
The home o wnership rate has stayed virtually c onstant during the whol e period fro m 
1960 to the present. However, a somewhat later transition to first home ownership has 
been evident. Very low rates of retur n on rental housing have not particularly deterred 
investors, although the government has helped  to cover the losses an d risks through 
negative gearing tax deductions against other income. 
A number o f recent lon gitudinal studies conducted in Austr alia have highlighted the  
importance of relationsh ip formation and breakup in tenure choice decisions, and th e 
present study intends to incorporate some of these issues.  
The questio n of tenure neutrality is briefly can vassed, as to whether some tenures  
should be assisted more than others. It is suggested that direct assista nce to home  
ownership is an inefficient way to a chieve some of the social benefits t hat have been 
considered to accrue from wider owner-occupation, and that policies aiming to 
improve diversity in ten ure and ho using types have been moderately successfu l in 
other countries. 
Recent surveys of housing policy in other countries have shown the sa me directions 
as Australia  – a slight decline in o wnership and a lack of expansion in the stock in 
favour of more rapid stock turnover. Demand-side policies have also not produced the 
expected supply-side response in Australia and, in Sydney in particular, there appears 
to be a modest but continuing sh ortage of su pply. Land price gradie nts have also  
steepened dramatically – possibly partly due  to land  supply const raints at  th e 
periphery, but also due to demographic change and economic restructuring. 
Housing markets in corporate both r apid short-t erm changes in demand and much  
longer term supply responses. Lo ng term ch anges in  planning regu lation and  local 
taxing that have added to the costs of n ew housing  have probably not been  
responsible in the short run for recent substanti al declines in affordability – since the 
price of pro ject homes has risen much more  slowly than the price  of established 
houses – b ut these co st increases do have in  the long term a potenti al to create a  
chronic affordability decline which will ultimately impact on ownership rates. 
The paper concludes with a summary of me thodology for the forthcoming project, 
which is essentially the same as that of Yates, with some technical modifications. The 
Appendix contains the data specifications for Census tables produced for the analysis. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background – the results of Yates 
AHURI Final Report No. 22 Housing implications of social, spatia l and struct ural 
change, by Professor Judith Yates, (2002) provides a disag gregated causal analysis 
of home ownership trends in Australia from 198 6-1996, with a perspective on income 
and regional polarisation. With the 2006 Census data becoming available, AHURI has 
sought an update of this analysis. The present project aims to follow the methodology 
of Yates to investigate what changes have occurred in the period 1996-2006 – in what 
we believe to be a very different era for global financial and labour markets. 
The major conclusions of Yates were that: 
Æ real incomes had declined over th e period, especially for younger a nd elderl y 
households, and that this was impacting on ho me ownership rates, wit h a drop of 
7 percentag e points in ownership rates among 25-44 year olds. Declines were 
greater in non-metropolitan regio ns. About a quarter of the declin e could be 
attributed to changes in household composition 
Æ there appeared to be  an emerg ent spatial polarisatio n of incomes. This  
polarisation was greater within cities  
Æ while home ownership  had declined by a small amount, the pro portion of  
households with mortgages had  declined  very significantly. Nevertheless, a 
significant number of yo unger households were  able to ent er into non- mortgaged 
ownership. 
She concludes:  
‘There has been both tenure and spatial polarisation of income for all household types 
in all age groups except for the  retirement age group. The econo mic advantage  
enjoyed by home owners in m etropolitan regions, as reflected in household incomes, 
is both in creasing relat ive to the ir counterpar ts in renta l housing in  metropolitan 
regions and to their fellow home owners in non-metropolitan regions.’ 
What the present study proposes is to see to what extent these trends have continued 
or reversed, while searching for possible new trends and examining a finer level of  
detail in some areas suggested by Yates. 
In the Positioning Pap er for this project, Yat es (2002a)  undertook an extremely 
thorough lit erature review of the following to pics related  to housing  tenure an d 
polarisation: 
Æ income and regional inequality in Australia 
Æ socio-tenurial polarisation 
Æ the economic and social advantages of home ownership 
Æ housing, labour markets, and the ‘Oswald hypothesis’. 
Apart from the first issue, which is critical to the study, we do not intend to revisit these 
topics directly. Instead we will concentrate on a range of other issues, including: 
Æ changes in the global and broader economic situation 
Æ increases in real household incomes  
Æ rising house prices and their cause 
Æ financial instability and debt 
Æ changes in home ownership and private rental 
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 Æ determinants of tenure choice, including changes in family structure 
Æ tenure-neutral policy 
Æ fast and slow processes in demand and supply of housing 
Æ urban planning – sprawl versus consolidation. 
Each of these is a large  subject in it s own right, and only a quick survey of the major 
issues affecting the present study will be canvassed. 
In the remainder of this section we will begin b y looking at  the major changes in t he 
global macroeconomic situation th at have taken place since 1996, including th e 
reversal in the very lo ng decline in resource prices as a result of a ctivity in the  
emerging giants, the growth of ho usehold de bt, the mas sive rise in asset prices,  
changes in inequality, and the subprime collapse.  
1.2 Change in the global macr oeconomic situation – reverse 
of the downwave 
First we will take a very brief look a t the current  rather complex positio n of the glo bal 
economy as a resu lt of  events and trends of the post-war years. This is not  strictly 
necessary t o the subsequent exposition, but it does ena ble the positioning of t he 
housing and economic trends of the last 20 years within a very long time framework.  
Probably the only empirical theory of very long ‘ secular’ trends in the glo bal capitalist 
economy is that of the Russian Nicolai Kondratyeff (1935). From his examination of  
long-term empirical dat a, Kondratyeff posit ed very long inflationary ‘K-upwaves’ and  
deflationary ‘K-downwaves’ in huma n affairs, wit h a rough cycle time of 54 years. K-
downwaves are associated with slow irregular growth and falling demands for capital  
investment of all kinds,  reflected most particularly in re source prices, but also i n 
interest rates and wages. K-upwaves are growth periods for world economies, as new 
technologies mature a nd come o nto line, and new coun tries join th e ranks of the  
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While the hypothesis has never been accep ted into the economic mainstrea m 
because it l acks a firm theoretical basis,1  nevertheless it has shown extraordinary 
resilience and predictive power, and the cycles  have continued to roll o n pretty much 
on track. A s Figure 1 shows, the p revious K-upwave was the great po st-war growth 
period 1949-74, and the downwa ve was the  period 1975-2003, finishing with  a  
symbolic thud in the disaster of 9/11.2   
The upwaves and down waves are s upposed also to coincid e with a ran ge of socio-
political events and attitudes. During upwaves, labour shortages give labour 
considerable bargainin g power – and these t imes are associated  with conservative  
attitudes, collective act ion, and rising in comes – along with many squabbles ove r 
resources. Because workers have little bar gaining power in downwaves, their real 
incomes fall and la issez-faire economics becomes the norm. These downwaves are 
periods of wild fluctuat ions in e conomies since excess capacity allo ws for rapid 
recessions and mini-boom recoveries; while  upwaves are long steady booms  
punctuated by occasional busts. 
Many subsequent autho rs have ela borated on the proposa l, particu larly during the  
just-concluded K-downwave. The  eminent  urban scho lar Brian Berry (199 1) 
associated long waves with “growth rings” in cities exposed to intern ational trad e 
(Sydney in particular shows evidence of su ch rings). Batra (2005) explained how t he 
United States Federal Reserve Board under the management of Allan Greenspan had 
prevented the US economy fro m falling i nto t ypical downwave recessions by usi ng 
Keynesian-style moneta ry demand management – but at t he cost of pumping US 
                                                
1 It does form one keystone of a major heterodox “evolutionary” stream in economics, due to Schumpeter 
(1989)..Significant contrib utions to the liter ature inc lude Alexander ( 2002), Barnett (199 8), Devez as 
(2005), F reeman (19 83), Goldstein (19 91), Hal l an d Preston (19 88), an d Va n Dui jn (1 983). 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kondratiev_wave has a good summary of the literature.  
2 In fact resour ce prices bottomed in t he LTCM/Russian crisis of 19 98, while interest rates hav e now in 
late 2008 once again returned to rock bottom in many countries due to policy responses to the current 
economic crisis. The whole period from 1998-2009 can be regarded as an extended long wave bottom. 
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 household debt and housing and stock markets up to unprecedented levels, and by 
raiding national supera nnuation fu nds. This h as prolonge d the perio d of financial 
adjustment typical of longwave troughs. 
UN-HABITAT (2003) cla imed that the wealthiest  group of co untries, and in particu lar 
the top decile of household incomes within those countries, had been able to maintain 
a comfortable growth in their lifestyles during 30 years of very low growth by drawing 
money from all the  lower income g roups and p oorer countr ies, who a s a result  had 
zero or negative gain although world producti vity increased steadily during the period. 
This provid es a plau sible (and co mplementary) alternative perspectiv e to the u sual 
rhetoric of globalisation and restructuring. 
Longwave reversals do not happen in a vacuum, and the present sea change in world 
affairs has been dominated by the entry of the giants China and India to  the ranks o f 
major manufacturing powers and e xporters. The CI technologies that  are driving th e 
new upwave reduce th e cost s of management and infor mation, but not particu larly 
energy or materials. The world is therefore heading int o an unfortunate situat ion 
where the numbers of middle cla ss will prob ably double globally, b ut resource s 
appear incr easingly scarce and congestion costs (such as the cost s of reducing  
greenhouse emissions)  are increasing. This is eventually e xpected to be highly 
inflationary, and the past few years have shown this to be  the case where energy and 
food prices are concerned.  
The long w ave normally comes out of a troug h with debt effectively redeemed and  
written off, but that has been far from the case in the present situation – so that further 
corrections have been necessary even though the resource cycle is well advanced. 
For three decades the  United Sta tes has been spendin g far beyon d what it h as 
earned and,  despite the  present resource boom, Australia h as followed in its wake.  
This has cr eated an unstable situ ation which has reached its denouement in t he 
current economic crisis. 
1.3 Change in the economic situation in Australia. 
For the purposes of this study it is not necessary to acce pt the whole Kondratye ff 
framework, simply to observe that real resour ce prices, interest rate s, and wages  
have reversed in Australia after a very long period of declin e (Figures 2 and 3 sho w 
the Australian commodity price index, which appears to have bottomed out in line with 
the K-wave timetable, and housing interest rates which also would have bottomed if  
not for the current massive intervention to shore up the global financial system). 
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 Figure 2: RBA Index of commodity prices (nominal) 1984-2009 
 
Source: RBA data 































































Source: RBA data 
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 Personal remuneration as a component of na tional inco me fell from a (proba bly 
unsustainable) peak in December 1974 of 63  per cent o f household  income, to a  
minimum in 1989 of 54 per cent, from which it has subsequently stabilised to about 56 
per cent (Saunders 2001, ABS National Accounts). Within this category however,  
wage inequality continued to grow until at least 2000, and wage factor costs continued 
to fall up to 2006.  
Australia is essentially a resource economy, and a chang e in the  price of resour ces 
meant a ma ssive surge  in prosperit y throughout the econo my in the period 2003- 8. 
The unemployment rate  sank below 4 per cent in Feb 2008,  to the lowe st level since 
1975, and the long-term unemployment rate sank below 1  per cent3  – rates typical of 
the last two K-upwaves (see Figure 4 for the very long term series). 
Figure 4: Unemployment rate, Australia, 1900-01 to 2003-04 
 
Source Australian Government (2004), Chart 2. 
Because A ustralia is a resource  economy and tied to  the commodity cycle,  the 
Australian d ollar fell in real terms for the whole K-downwave (apart from a short 
recovery from 1985-1989). Since  the China -India boo m swung into gear, t he 
Australian dollar rose rapidly from about 47c US in 2001 to near- parity with the  US 
dollar, before falling away in the current recession.4  
                                                
3 Labour F orce, Australia . AB S Cat.No. 610 2.0, and Australian L abour Market Statistics , ABS Cat.No.  
6105.0 
4 Sourced from http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/HistoricalExchangeRates/index.html 
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Source: RBA and US Federal Reserve5 
The money supply has also risen extremely rapidly in line with debt. From the election 
of the Howard government in 1996 almost to the present, the Australia n Government 
has followe d an extremely inflationary economic policy, in monetarist terms. From 
March 1996 to April 200 7, currency grew by ove r 100 per ce nt, bank deposits by 224 
per cent an d M1 mone y supply by 200 per ce nt.6  Much o f this mone y appears to 
have been borrowed overseas by the banks for the purpose of home lending. 7  
Household debt has risen (albeit from historically low level s) by an a verage of 14 per 
cent per a nnum (Res erve Bank 2003); from about 40 per cent  of househ old 
disposable income (HHDI) in the 1 980s – not much more than half that of the USA –  
to about 140 per cent of HHDI, above the level of the USA (see Figure 5). 
  
                                                
5 Historical data, RBA Table B21 (accessed from 
http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/B21hist.xls)   US Federal Reserve Statistical 
Releases (March 2008) (accessed from 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/Current/data.htm) 
6 Reserve Bank Sta tistical Bul letins; Jackson (2007). In th e early part o f 2008, the money supply was 
severely reined in and this has affected growth in all the aggregates. 
7 T im Coleb atch, ke ynote sp eech t o 3 rd H ousing Rese archers’ Conf erence. Overseas borrowings by 
Australian fi nancial i nstitutions hav e ris en fr om u nder $5 0 bil lion i n 1991 to $ 262 bi llion in  2 008 ( RBA 
Bulletin table D03hist), though a good portion of this has also gone to business loans.  
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 Figure 6: Components of household debt as a fraction of household disposable income, 
Australia 1990-2002 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) 
Figure 6 shows that almost all of this growth was for ho using, with an especially 
significant growth in lending for investor housing which, as we will see, has helped to 
keep rents down at historical lows relative to house prices.  
The RBA (2003) concluded that:   
‘The principal reason th at household debt has grown is that with low interest rate s, 
households can now borrow more when they take out their housing loan. This pushes 
up the average size of new loans, and in tim e, pushes up the average size of loa ns 
outstanding.’ 
The picture of unrestrained growth in money u nder the Ho ward government should, 
however, be considered  in the context of the lo nger term. Figure 7 sh ows growth in 
some important monetary aggregates from 1977-2007. The ‘Business borrowings’ line 
is probably the most closely related to economic activity, showing typical K-downwave 
instability – the irregular blow-out pr ior to the  1987 crash, the recessions of 19 91-93 
and of 200 2, and the steady boom into 2008  followed b y collapse. The M3 mo ney 
spike8  of 1989 coincided with an investor move out of stocks into the property market 
(shown in the ‘Housing investor’ line), which also subseque ntly crashed into the ba nk 




                                                
8 The M3 is th e broa dest me asure of n ational mo ney su pply us ed by economists. It inclu des act ual 
printed money plus most forms of commercial bank money (money created through loans). 
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What is per haps most important for this study is the stead y stream of  new housing 
investment loans during the entire 30 years of ‘l ow inflation’, cycling between 10 an d 
20 per cent  annual gro wth rates and, in many cases, pu lling out of “slumps” more 
rapidly than the mone y supply M3.  The first case of downside divergence between 
lending for housing and money supply occurred  in mid-2008, with the f ormer being at 
a low and t he latter at a high (reflecting the extraordinary stock market boom) –
showing weakening ho using markets and tigh t rental markets – and followed by a  
complete collapse of investor spending on housing in the current recession.  
1.4 Changes in inequality 
Yates (2002 a,b) examin ed polarisat ion of  incom es from 1986-1996 in considerable 
detail. In this section, studies documenting the changes in  income and wealth post-
1996 are examined, as well as several reports not considered in Yates (2002a).  
1.4.1 Income inequality 
Until the last few years of the downwave, income and we alth inequality rose steadil y 
on a global basis. UN-HABITAT(2003:52) writes: ‘The long g rowth period from 1945-
1973 was typified by falling inequ ality and improving e quity. The situation th en 
reversed: income ine quality and  poverty increased without respite during  the  
recession years from 1978-1993, and real inco mes actually fell for the  bottom income 
groups in most countrie s and for th e world as a whole.’ In t heir Figure 3.4, they show 
that the global Gini coefficient had r isen only marginally from 1950-197 8, but spurred 
by a series of market ‘reforms’ and transfers to  the affluent  which reversed many of 
the welfare gains of the post-war p eriod, it rose quite rapidly up to 19 98. Particularly 
within the market-oriented econo mies, inco me inequality also rose rapidly at the  
national level, mostly d ue to a rise in the incomes of the top deciles (S aunders 2001, 
Yates 2002a). 
Real incomes of the lowest groups in the English-spea king econo mies began to 
increase after 1994, recovering some of the su bstantial losses of real in come by th e 
‘working poor’ during the 1980s. Nevertheless, inequality continued to increase until at 
least 2003.  
A full consistent series o f household incomes per person is not available over the full 
downwave period from 197410 . The ABS has provided a series 1994-2006 (Figure 8) 
                                                
9 Sourced from http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/D01hist.xls 
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Source: Household Income and Income Distribution, Australia. ABS . Cat No 6523.0 
Figure 8 shows that eq uivalised household income per person grew o nly very slowly 
at less than 1 per cent per year until  2003, and then began to accelerate  rapidly from 
2004-2006 as labour shortages began to bite as the new long wave gai ned 
momentum, rising by over 20 per cent in the lowest income quintile and around 17 per 
cent in the others. This provided a catch-up for  the lowest income groups to achiev e 
close to parity with 1994-95, though the very substantial welfare ground lost during the 
neoliberal period 1975-1993 will probably never be recovered. 
The sudden  boost in incomes is paralleled b y the substantial incre ase in money 
supply and asset prices during the period, which gave a massive boost in wealth t o 
the top group.  
1.4.2 Spatial inequality 
Yates (2002a,b) devot ed conside rable attention to regional divides in income,  
referring to a number of  studies that showed increasing incomes in the  richer areas  
and decreasing incomes in the poorer areas of Australia up to about 1996.  
A number of reports by NATSEM have investigated changes in spatial inequality since 
1996. Ranking Australian postcod es by average income and forming decile s, 
AMP/NATSEM (2004) f ound that th ere had bee n strong income growth  during 199 6-
2001 of at least 23 per cent for all postcode de ciles, but it was upper-middle income  
deciles that had made t he greatest gains, averaging about 27 per cent ¬ showing a 
mild increase in ’spatial’ polarisation. 
  
                                                                                                                                          
10 Real household incomes fell in every quintile except the top in the period from 1975-2000, but this is 
not very meaningful because household size fell so substantially in the period. 
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 Table 1: Estimated percentage change in average gross household income, by state 
and region, 1996 to 2001 
 Capital 
Major 
urban Regional Rural Rural All 
 cities areas towns towns areas regions 
 % % % % % % 
New South Wales 26.9 25.6 21.1 23.1 27.8 26.2 
Victoria 26.4 24.4 26.2 27.6 28.5 26.7 
Queensland 22.8 19.8 18.3 19.5 19.2 21.8 
South Australia 24.1  23.1 28.3 28.3 24.3 
Western Australia 21.2  14.8 15.9 10.2 19.5 
Tasmania 18.5  16.6 18.4 20.8 18.3 
Northern Territory 14.9  18.2 28.3 16.4 18.1 
Australian Capital 
Territory 24.4     24.4 
Australia 25 22.5 20.1 22.8 23.9 24.5 
Source: AMP/NATSEM (2004), Table 1. 
The authors attribute higher inco mes in different postcodes both to much higher 
workforce participation  and empl oyment rat es, and to higher proportions of 
professionals. 
The NATSEM Table 1 o f income gr owth rates by region is somewhat countercyclical  
and unexpected, showing the lowest growth rates in rural WA and the highest rates in 
rural South Australia and Victoria. The longer term analysis shown in Figure 9 below 
puts this in the proper perspective. 
Figure 9: Real income per taxpayer 1981-2005 













































































































Source: BITRE database. 
The Bureau of Infrastructure, Tr ansport an d Regional Economics maintains a  
database o f real taxable incomes by SLA and LGA, and from t his we have  
constructed a longer series. This shows that the NATSEM five-year results can be 
misleading: in the longer term. Perth has been the big winner (it plateaued in the early 
2000s between two major rises), fo llowed by Sydney. In the non-metropolitan areas, 
Rural WA has had the highest real incomes throughout most of the 1981-2005 period, 
although incomes suffered a large slump in 1990.  
The measurement of spatial inequality – a conundrum 
Despite the  above results, Flood (2000a) sh owed that between 1975 and 199 6, 
spatial inequality in S ydney as measured by  the ind ex of dissimilarity actually 
decreased, with both smaller and l arger geographical area s becoming more  socially 
homogenous. This appeared to have happene d because the weakening of planning 
regulations had caused a mix of te nures and dwelling types in many areas, al lowing 
for a greater social mix. Flood (2000b) showed that home owners hip and free-
standing dwellings were  in fact much less deter minants of spatial ineq uality in 199 6 
than they h ad been in 1975. The major separating factor s were now profession al 
status/tertiary qualifications and lon g-term residential stability. 11  At least in Sydney,  
different ten ure types a nd dwelling types had mixed –  a pparently as a result of 
changes in urban planning regimes and the withdrawal of the local state.  
Flood (2000a) pointed out that in fact spatial po larisation12  had remained remarkably 
constant throughout 1975-1996. The same apparently contradictory result was foun d 
in the USA 2001 census, in that urban spatial areas were more mixed with a diffusion 
of richer and poorer individuals into  formerly ho mogenous areas – but the difference  
in incomes between the richer and poorer areas had incre ased. In oth er words, the  
apparent polarisation of urban areas has been an income effect rather than a spatial  
effect. 
 
                                                
11 Baum (1997) identified many of the same factors in a non-multilinear analysis.  
12 In terms of the prop ortion of  peop le who would need to  move to obta in incom e par ity b etween al l 
areas. 
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 The continuation to 2001-06 
An update of this study for 2001-06, AMP-NATSEM (2008), showed an acceleration in 
the rate of income increase fro m the pre vious five years, with gross adjusted 
household incomes increasing by an average 28 per cent ( or 31 per ce nt allowing for 
the fall in household size) compared with 25 per cent for the previous five years. Once 
again, the top 20 per cent of SLAs registered a greater rise in household incomes by 3 
to 5 per cent. 
The report showed a particularly spectacular increase in housing costs of 62 per cent, 
falling more heavily on the middle income groups. This ‘ho using bombshell’ reduced 
the gain after housing over the period to about  23 per cent, less than in the previous  
five years. And, once inflation and  housing costs were taken into a ccount, gro ss 
incomes increased by an unimpressive 1.5 per cent per year in Sydney. 
While the 2 001-06 report did not give the same spatial de tail as it s pr edecessor, it 
showed a broad regional change in incomes more in line with the intuitive results of  
Figure 9, with equivalen t household  incomes rising most q uickly in  resource-based 
rural Queensland and Western Australia (41 per cent) and in the two territories (38 per 
cent) while incomes ro se 27 to  30  per cent  elsewhere). Housing co sts rose  by a 
similar amount in all th e capital cit ies except Darwin, wh ere they ro se in line w ith 
incomes. 
1.5 The rise of house prices 
Throughout the whole downwave, in terest rates have fallen and housing  asset prices 
have slowly risen in  balance. In Australia, prices rose during the boom years of 1987-
1989 and th en suffered a long flat  correction. Y ates (2002b, Figure 4.1 ) shows tha t 
real house prices almost doubled in Sydney d uring this boom, corrected by abou t 15 
per cent up to 1993, and then began to rise steadily. In Brisbane, they rose by 50+ per 
cent in the boom continuing to 1992, and rema ined there. In other citie s they rose by 
30 to 40 per cent in the boom and by 1996, had fallen back almost to 1986 levels.  
From 1996, the environment for housing markets has been much more benign not just 
in Australia but globally.  Since that time house price rise s in most OECD countries  
have been particularly startling. But even in the longer term, Girouard et al (2006) find: 
‘At least since 1970, real house prices have fluctuated around an upward trend, which 
is generally attributed t o rising de mand for h ousing spa ce linked to increasing p er 
capita income, growing populatio ns, supp ly factors su ch as land  scarcity a nd 
restrictiveness of zoning laws, quality improvement and comparatively low productivity 
growth in construction . A nu mber of elements in th e current situation ar e 
unprecedented: the size  and duratio n of the cur rent real ho use price increases; the 
degree to which they have tended to move together across countrie s; and the extent 
to which the y have disconnected fr om the business cycle … If house  prices were to 
adjust down ward, possibly in  respo nse to an  increase in  interest rate s or for other 
reasons, the historica l record suggests that th e drops (in real terms) might be larg e 
and that the process could be protracted.’ 
  
 15
 Figure 10: House price to income ratios 1986-2007, English-speaking countries 
Source: Richards (2008) 
Of all the countries in the OECD, h ouse prices have risen t he furthest and fastest in 
Australia since 1996 – apart from Ireland and Spain which have had th eir own maj or 
booms. Figure 10 shows that Australia, which ha s always been regarded as a country 
of cheap h ousing and easily available land,  has become on e of the  most expensive  
countries for housing (see Section 3.2 for more discussion).  
In Australia,  since 1996, average h ouse prices have more than doubled in nomin al 
terms and risen by around 80 per cent in real terms — over half of this in the last three 
years. House prices in Australia are well above what might be expec ted from re ntal 
levels or in relation to average incomes, as Figure 11 below shows. 
Figure 11: Real house prices and fundamentals 
 
Source: Richards (2008) 
OECD Indexes of hou se price s t o annual in come and house price s to rents in 
Australia ar e shown in  Figure 12 as being 8 0 per cent a bove the lo ng-term trend  
average, and therefore likely to fall.  
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 Figure 12: House price valuations against the long-term trend, Australia. 
 
Source: Girouard et al  (2006) 
The availability of finance is the mai n shor t-term constraint on the property market, 
and house prices will continue to ri se as long as money is available. Cheaper, more  
readily available housin g finance in  a booming economy, with some added policy 
stimulus, has resulted in  a prolonged surge in d emand. Much of the rise in Australia  
was predica ted by easier finance, expressed largely through the rise in the money 
supply shown in Section 1.3. Borrowing for h ousing has increased o ver four-fold  in 
real terms since the early 1990s.13   
As housing  supply cannot be incr eased very much in the shorter term, this extra 
borrowing found its way largely into increased  housing pr ices. The R eserve Bank  
(2003) writes, ‘The  stability of the  aggregate home-ownership rate suggests that the 
increased availability of credit was l argely capitalised into housing prices rather tha n 
generating a wider spread of owner-occupation.’  
However, d eregulation and liberalisation of th e finance sector has a lso played a  
considerable role, with  greater fle xibility in fin ancial instruments and l ess restr ictive 
lending practices. Ellis (2006) describes ‘the  wave  of deregulation and product 
innovation t aking pla ce in fin ancial sector s in  most coun tries. Thi s has reduce d 
interest margins on housing loans, lowering real interest  rates paid by mortgage 
borrowers. Greater competition and product in novation has also enco uraged lenders 
to make finance available to a wider range of potential bo rrowers than before.’  Th e 
IMF (2008:134) adds: ’more flexible and competitive mortgage markets have amplified 
the impact of monetary policy on house price s and thus,  ultimately, on consumer 
spending and output’. 
In Australia,  increased competition among credit providers has contr ibuted to th e 
doubling of the number of products provided by lenders, including: 
Æ flexible mortgages with variable repayments 
Æ split-purpose loans (splits loan into two sub-accounts, giving tax advantages) 
Æ deposit bonds (insurance company guarantees payment of deposit at settlement) 
Æ non-conforming loans 
Æ redraw facilities and offset accounts 
Æ new providers, including mortgage originators and brokers. 
                                                
13 It has also inc reased from 10.3 per cent of  asset value in late 198 9 up t o 26.6 per ce nt at the end of 
2007. http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/B21hist.xls  
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 To a fair ext ent, rising house prices are associated with mo vements of capital in and  
out of the stock market. The investor-driven component of demand for housing was  
further stimulated by the downturn in the share market from 2000 to ear ly 2003; by a 
‘supportive’ tax en vironment (see section 2. 2); and by aggressive marketing o f 
housing investment ‘opportunities’. 
In general, government policy has f uelled the r ises – part icularly through the blowo ut 
in the money supply, the facilitatio n of easy consumer debt, lack of incentives to 
supply, and demand-side incentives such as the First Home Owners Scheme. 
Throughout the OECD, bubbles in house prices fuelled by money supply rises ha ve 
been followed by subst antial collapses. Girouard et al.  (2006) writes: ‘If  house prices  
were to adj ust downward, possibly in response  to an increase in interest rates or for 
other reasons, the hist orical record suggests that the drops (in real terms) might  be  
large and that the process could be protracted’. As an e xample, Hamnett (1999 ) 
describes how house p rices fell in South Eastern England for ten years  following the  
end of the boom of the 1970s and  1980s. Bor do and Jea nne (2002) conclude th at 
property price booms were three times more like ly to be  followed b y a ‘bust’ t han 
booms in the stock market.  
This has rarely been  the case in post-war Australia because immigration has  
continued t o protect housing markets and to provide a f loor to possible price fa lls. 
Downturns in the Austra lian market have most commonly manifested themselves in a 
stabilisation in nominal house prices leading to a fall in real prices due to the effects of 
inflation, rat her than b y significan t and wide spread declines in nominal prices. 
However, p ast experience shows that nomi nal prices can fall ap preciably – for 
example, the median detached ho use price in  Sydney fell by 25 per cent in th e two 
years following the end of the boom in the late 1980s.  
Nevertheless, these ev ents have been so ra re in Austr alia compared with other 
countries that it is popularly taken as a given that house prices will rise indefinitely and 
that it  is ne cessary to ‘stay in’ a  market that  will r ise indefinitely. This confidence in 
itself helps to sustain Australian housing markets. 
1.6 Debt and financial market instability 
1.6.1 The Deregulation crisis of 1990 
Yates’ study of changes in tenure from 1986-96 was conducted against a background 
of considerable turmoil in financial markets following global financial deregulation. The 
deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s helped to fuel the boom-bust of the mid-
1980s leading very rapidly to large-scale prudential failures until governments and the 
industry took action to curb excesses. In the USA during the Savings and Loan Crisis, 
from 1986 to 1995, the number of US federally-insured savings and loans funds in the 
United States declined  from 3,234 to 1,645. T his was primarily, but not exclusively, 
due to unsound real estate lending. 14  Se veral regional banks also failed , leading to  
the crisis of confiden ce and recession of t he early 1990s. The  US. Gene ral 
Accounting Office estimated the cost of the crisis was around USD $160 billion, about 
$124.6 billion of which was directly paid for by the US Government. House prices fell 
about 9 per cent during  the height of the crisis from late 1 989 to mid-1993. Similar 
loan crises occurred in  man y othe r countries that had e mbraced de regulation (in  
Sweden, five of the six largest banks had to be shored up by the government). 
In Australia,  a number of prominent collap ses also occurr ed following  deregulatio n, 
most notable of which was the failure of the State Bank of Victoria following the 
                                                
14 The United States Lea gue of Savings  Institutions writes: ’Anxious to improve earnings, they departed 
from their traditional lending practices into credits and markets involving higher risks, but with which they 
had little experience’. 
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 Tricontinental collapse in 1990. The State Bank of South Australia also failed and had 
to be rescued by the  state government wi th $3.3 billion of taxpa yers’ money. A 
number of building an d credit societies we re also exp osed to risky commercial 
lending, the most notable being the Pyramid Building Society collapse, which resulted 
in a 3 cent levy per litre on petrol in Victoria for five years.15  
Innovative lending for low income borrowers also led  to fa ilures. The  f irst mortgage 
backed securitisation s in Australia , in the American style, relied on substantial 
government involveme nt. The NSW Go vernment mortgage finan cing agency,  
FANMAC, and the mort gage originator, Home Fund, suffered significa nt difficulties in 
the early 1990s and req uired a $40 0 million rescue packag e 16. These o rganisations 
ran into trouble because HomeFund was providing home loans to high  risk borrowers 
who could not meet th eir repayme nts. Low-income or poo rly-equipped household s 
that could not service their repayments we re heavily targeted. The specially designed 
low-start products involved steep increases in repayments made by borrowers after a 
certain period of time had elapsed. The system was also dependent on high rates of  
inflation and interest rates continuin g, and man y borrowers found themselves locke d 
into uncompetitively high fixed interest rates. At  its highe st level, FANMAC had $4.6 
billion of securities on issue. A 1993 Auditor Ge neral’s report showed that 11 per cent 
of HomeFund’s un subsidised borrowers and 3 5 per cen t of HomeFund’s subsidised 
borrowers were in default.  
FANMAC seems to be regarded as a valuable l esson for the mortgage finance sector 
in what not to do, and government s subsequently limited their exposure to all such  
risky ventures. Neverth eless, private organi sations such as RAMS and  Aussie Home  
Loans conti nued to expand and, by March 2 000, $34.7 billion of securitised f unds 
backed by domestic re sidential mortgages wer e on issue.  This repre sented a  very 
substantial supplement to tradition al banking  sources of  f inance for home lending. 
Compared with the USA, these se curitisations have been heavily protected against  
default, with 100 per ce nt principal and interest repayment insurance policy on each  
mortgage, provided from highly rated specialist lenders’ mortgage insurers.  
1.6.2 The subprime crisis of 2007-08 
The securitised government-backed mortgage lenders in the United States have been 
far larger and more successful, and they did not have to learn the same hard lessons 
about prudential control in the early 1990s. Eve ntually, once another housing boo m 
and bust hit, the American home finance industry f ound itself in crisis. While this crisis 
began in October 2007, outside the period of the present study, it has it s roots in  the 
excesses of the early years of the millennium. 
Between 1997 and 2006, American home prices almost tripled. 17  Some homeowners 
used their increased property values to refinance their homes with lower interest rates 
and to take  out secon d mortgages against t he added value to use  the funds for 
consumer spending. As in Australia, US house hold debt as a percentage of income  
rose to 130 per cent during 2007.  
A small proportion of th ese loans (6.2 per cent ) were subprime mortga ges made to  
borrowers who did not qualify f or standard  loans, an d who often belonged  to 
minorities. By March 2007, the value of these loans was US$1.3 trillion . About a thi rd 
had low-star t ‘sweetener ’ interest rat es that jumped substan tially after t he qualifying 
period. By October 2007, when the house price bubble b urst, about 16 per cent of  
                                                
15 http://fsgstudy.treasury.gov.au/content/_download/Davis_Report/rtf/24_Appendix4-2.rtf  
16 http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hansart.nsf/V3Key/LC19931215006  




 these mortgages were in default, resulting i n foreclosur e notices o n 1.3 million  
properties, a million of which have subsequently been executed. 
A small proportion of th ese loans (6.2 per cent ) were subprime mortga ges made to  
borrowers who did not qualify f or standard  loans, an d who often belonged  to 
minorities. By March 2007, the value of these loans was US$1.3 trillion . About a thi rd 
had low-star t ‘sweetener ’ interest rat es that jumped substan tially after t he qualifying 
period. By October 2007, when the house price bubble b urst, about 16 per cent of  
these mortgages were in default, resulting i n foreclosur e notices o n 1.3 million  
properties, a million of which have subsequently been executed.  
The jury is still out in  mortgage-backed secur ities, which have come to predominate  
as the source of housin g funds in the USA. 18   On the one hand, it is regarded as a  
positive that these secur ities spread risks of mortgage default throughout the system, 
particularly in the USA where mortgage defaults are limited l iability ‘non-recourse’ and 
more commonplace, th ereby taking the load off the banks. On the o ther hand, t he 
exact impact of widespr ead defaults becomes more and more uncertain,  and the fear 
of ‘contagion’ leads gov ernments to intervene, causing pro blems of moral hazard for 
debt issuers who know t he tab for failures due to  unsound practices will be picked u p 
by the taxpayer.  
The marked decline in underwriting standards appears to be related to the origination 
system that was prevalent in the US system. Those who originated the loan were paid 
on the volu me of loans they were writing. The se loans were then so ld to anoth er 
entity, generally an inve stment bank, who then packaged the loans into  a residential 
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) which was sold to investors and other 
securitisation vehicles. The originators had no long-term incentive, beyond reputation,  
to ensure that the underwriting standards were adequate. Automatic computerised  
approval systems, which orig inally were seen as a pana cea for race- based redlining 
and other d iscriminatory practices, 19  have not turned out  to be as accurate an d 
objective in asse ssing risk as originally hoped. On the b orrowers’ side, 
misrepresentation of in comes or documents se ems also to  have been common, a nd 
these fraudulent applications were five times as likely to go into default.20   
By mid-200 8, banks sought US$250 billion in  funds from  investors t o meet their 
losses, and a major cre dit crunch ensued, with a downturn in all forms of economic  
activity in the USA. Due to se curitisation, the risk was spread widely and impacted on 
the whole financial sector. This had a global ripple effect on all forms of finance.  
The initia l h ousing impa ct of the  su bprime crisis would pro bably not h ave been as 
great as the Savings and Loan Crisis, but its ef fect was magnified many times an d 
spread throughout the world economy by the credit bubble that had developed around 
mortgage-backed secur ities. The magnitude and the speed of these de clines, which 
have been likened to a  ‘perfect sto rm’, were g reater than anything seen since th e 
1930s. Reserve bank governor Glenn Stevens said in September 2008:  
‘The sophisticated fina ncial syste m of the 2 1st century was supposed to  
spread risk, but a lot of t he risk ended up concentrated on the books of highly 
leveraged institutions’. 
                                                
18 The IMF (2004) writes: ‘ Mortgage-backed securiti es comprise a bout 12 per cent  of residenti al 
mortgage lending in Ireland; 8 per cent in the United Kingdom; 4 per cent in the Netherlands; 6 per cent 
in Sp ain; a nd 18 p er cent i n Australia. In contrast, in th e Unit ed State s, mortga ge-backed s ecurities 
comprise 57 per cent of home mortgages’.  
19 See for example UN-HABITAT (2001). 
20 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisis#cite_note-41 
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 The vehicles by which mortgage risk was shared throughout the financial system most 
commonly took the form of Collate ralised Debt  Obligations (CDOs), special purp ose 
vehicles th at bundled  assets,  especially mortgage-backed securit ies, commercial  
property and high yielding corporat e debt, and  sold tran ches of synth etic bonds and 
equity issue d at different risk levels. 21  By late  2007, nearly two third s of all US 
mortgages were held in these pools. Once the underlying assets were in default  
however, almost half of all bundled  derivatives were in default, and the losses co uld 
not be quar antined. Co nfidence in  all forms of  complex derivatives eroded, credit  
markets froze and it  b ecame very difficu lt to obtain finan ce of any kind. Financial 
institutions reported losses of US$435 billion by July 20 08, and three major US 
investment banks failed  in September 2008, while the prin cipal issuers of mortga ge 
backed securities were  nationalised. By the end of 2008,  $1.1 trillion  of losse s ha d 
been reported, with a further $1 trillion anticipated. A rescue stimulus package of $1.2 
trillion reached final approval in February 2009. 
The decline in the broa der economy fed back into the hou sing market,  exacerbating 
the problem. A continued wave of  foreclosure s put rapid  downward  pressure o n 
housing markets. The United States has lost $6 trillion in  housing wealth since the 
peak of the bubble. By t he end of  2008, the US  housing market had fallen by 23 p er 
cent and ha d given back all it s bubble gains – while seeming likely to f all further. An  
additional 5.9 million foreclosures were expected over the next four years to 2013. 
While a number of other countries had enjoyed an even greater housing bubble due to 
easy finance, this was not among low-income households as in the USA, and housing 
prices rema ined high.  However, th e subseque nt credit  sq ueeze and recession was 
rapidly exported – par ticularly to countries h ighly leveraged with d ebt. In Spa in, 
unemployment rose to almost 14  per cent; in Ireland universal wage cuts were  
proposed; while several British  b anks and  all Icelandic banks w ere effectiv ely 
nationalised. While most national stock markets fell by more than 50 per cent in the 12 
months from November 2007, house prices had not fallen  very far as there were few 
foreclosures to set the pace, and so median household wealth had not declined to the 
extent of the USA. 
What was however ap parent was a substant ial fall in ne w construction from 2007  
levels – an annual contraction of 50 per cent in housing starts in the USA, and 27 per 
cent in the UK to a post-war low – and a similar fall in property sales. In Australia, new 
construction fell by 25  per cent, while the p urchase an d refinancin g of existin g 
dwellings fell by 35 per cent from historic highs.  
A surplus inventory of homes has o ccurred,22   with a sub stantial fall in  house prices 
which has impacted further on consumer spending and the default rate. Overbuild ing 
during the boom period, increasin g foreclosur e rates and unwillingn ess of many 
homeowners to sell their homes at reduced ma rket prices have significantly increased 
the supply of housing inventory available, and housing investment has slowed . 
According to former US Federal Chief, Paul Volcker:  
‘The country has been spending more than it’s been produ cing, and that will 
have to co me to an end. So far , the poten tial lo sses look manageable, 
compared with the sa vings-and-loan crisis of  the 1980s and the tech-stock 
crash of  2000-02. But t he housing debacle could yet take  years to work out, 
thanks to th e sheer co mplexity of  it. The new financial system – shifting risk 
                                                
21 These offered  returns a fe w percentage points above the market while claiming to be very low r isk. 
Many instit utions took a dvantage of thes e in the l ow-interest fi nancial environment after the dot-co m 
collapse, including a number of Australian local governments.  
22 See. for example. IMF (2008), Figure 2.1 
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 from banks to securities markets – has worked ‘pretty well’ up until now. We’re 
going to find out if it works well for a major-league crisis’.23    
On the positive side, it is agreed that subprime lending improved the home ownership  
rate in the USA fro m 64 per cent in 1994 to 69.2 per cent in 2004. Debelle (200 8), 
Assistant Governor of t he Reserve Bank of Australia, states: ‘One note worthy feature 
associated with the expansion of non-prime lending has been the rise in home-
ownership rates, particularly amon gst minoritie s, that it ha s facilitated.  Delinquency 
rates may be currently around 25 per cent, that does mean that 75 per cent of  
borrowers have thus far been able to purchase a house’.  
This disturbing level of delinquency would be unacceptable in other parts of the world 
for such a limited benefit, and adds credence to naysayers who have often stated that 
extending home own ership to lower inco me groups is an unne cessarily risky 
business.  
Initially, Australia was partially insulated from the subprime crisis because its economy 
is increasingly connected to East Asia rather than the United States. Nevertheless the 
credit crun ch has had  an effect  an d both the  stock market and house  prices have  
come off the boil in 2008.24  A few local councils and hedge funds have had exposure, 
but most balance sheets are strong. 
Is Australia also at risk of housing market default? Debelle  (2008) believes not 25 , in 
that:  
Æ Non-conforming housing loans are only 1 per cent of the market. Arrears on these 
loans are well above average at 4.5 per cent, but far b elow the US. Unde r 
Australian law and custom there are much greater incentives for consumers not to 
default on h ouse loans,  and institut ions are much more prepared to prevent this 
happening. 
Æ Low-start instruments and discount s are relatively limited here. Avera ge loan to 
valuation ratios are con siderably higher here, an d lending pr actices are generally 
more conservative. 
Æ The bulk of the finance debt in Aust ralia is he ld by high income earners, which is  
where the risk should reside.  
Nevertheless, desp ite this extra pr udential care, on the  gross aggregates Australian 
housing and financial markets are in an even more unsustainable and  bulging sta te 
than the USA, and it  is questionable that the balloon can hold on a ll fronts until asset 
inflation diminishes to more manageable levels, or incomes and rents rise to match. 
1.6.3 Securitisation in Australia 
Much of the concern in the subpr ime crisis h as been ab out securit isation and it s 
potential fo r ’contag ion’ with the  risks of  widespread mortgage default  sp read 
throughout the financial sector. It ap pears that it  is this, p lus the blow-out in housin g 
credit, which has led the RBA to  its current in terest in housing markets, with man y 
bulletins and research papers devoted to these topics.26  




24 F ixed bus iness lend ing in p articular fell from a re cord $ 35.6 bi llion to $21.6 billion, Jan-Apr il 20 08. 
(RBA Table D06, Lending commitments). 
25 RBA (2007) Fi nancial Stability Review, March, contains considerable data in support of this assertion.  
However the subsequent global meltdown has shown that the spreading of risk has threatened the whole 
global financial system. 
26 Prior to 2004, housing was not particularly a brief of the RBA. However, a search of their site reveals 
over 100 housing-related publications or presentations since 2006.  
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 Mortgage-backed se curitisation sta rted in a modest way in Australia around 198 7, 
sponsored by state housing dep artments in NSW and Victoria a s a possib le 
alternative to their concessional len ding programs under t he Commo nwealth State 
Housing Agreement (CSHA). Soon private sector originators took over the activity and 
it grew rapidly from $5 bi llion in 1996. Asset-backed securities hit their highest point in 
June 2007, with $274 bi llion worth o f assets held in se curitisation vehicles and $2 16 
billion issued in outsta nding loans – about 35 per cent of outstandi ng lending for 
housing. This had fallen to 28 per cent by April 2008.27  
About 5 per  cent of  the securit ised loans are subprime. Losses on  the pool of loans 
have been almost negligible to date, and investors have shown increasing confidence 
in the issues, with spreads against the bank bill rate steadily falling from 2000 to 2006 
(Reserve Bank 2006).28   
However, in early 2008  no issues were made in  the afterma th of the su bprime crisis. 
The Reserve Bank began intervening in the market for asset backed securities in  a 
fairly substantial way by making on-market purchases to kick-start the sector, totalling 
$2.35 billion by April 2008.29  Governor Glenn Stevens said in April 2008:  
‘In periods of particularly unusual m arket duress, central banks should be prepared to 
move beyond the nor mal scope of operation s to provid e liquidity a gainst a br oad 
range of assets’.  
By late 2008 evidence of a sustained global downturn had become overwhelming, and 
the Federal government has so far unveiled $72 billion in stimulus spe nding, coupled 
with a guarantee of bank deposits and a very substantial drop in interest rates. It is  
expected that continued injections of funds will be necessary to keep the economy on 
an even keel. 
SECTION SUMMARY 
This se ction has engag ed in a bro ad overview of change s in the world economic 
situation in the two decades 1986-1996 and 1996-2006.  
In the earlier period studied by Yates, erratic economic conditions a nd low growth 
persisted from a period  of very high interest ra tes and unemployment around 1986, 
and in these uncertain times households paid off  their mortgage debt rapidly. A maj or 
bank crisis and credit crunch occur ring around 1990 in the aftermath of deregulation  
was sympto matic of the  generally h ostile mortg age market condition s. A ‘hollowin g 
out’ of labour markets extended from 1976 and contributed to rising household income 
inequality.  
The period  of the  pr esent study  was benig n by comparison, with  acceleratin g 
economic growth after 1988 as th e Asian su perpowers extended their economic  
expansion. Wages rose quite rap idly after 1998  and unemployment fell to levels not 
seen since t he 1960s. However, the top in come group con tinued to ga in income and 
wealth disproportionately, especially as asset prices rose.  
Much of the period was a very lax t ime for mon etary policy. Interest rat es were low,  
finance was freely available and de bt soared. House prices rose relat ive to income s 
and rents to levels neve r seen before, largely fuelled by the debt explosion. However, 
new supply did not respond to this huge increase in demand and in housing turnover. 
In Australia,  most of th is wealth bubble resid ed in e stablished dwellings in  goo d 
locations, a ccompanying greater income inequality. Although assiste d by the First  
                                                
27 RBA Table D02 
28 In the USA these spreads rocketed in 2007. 
29 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601081&sid=aegfyWnNxJyE  
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 Home Owner’s grants, many younger people continued to shun the market and, as in  
the previous decade, home ownership stayed steady despite an aging population.  
The bubble  in house  prices and  debt in the  USA had been acco mpanied by lax 
lending pra ctices and complex securitisat ion which sprea d the risk t hroughout t he 
world econo my. In the period immediately fo llowing this study, the ho using market  
began to d eflate in the USA an d widespread delinquencies in mortgages and 
associated debt products occurred.  Credit dried up globally with disastrous results for 
some countries. The m alaise created a globa l economic downturn and stock market  
collapse. Very rapid falls of 25 per cent in  house prices in the USA from a high in mid-
2006 were immediately followed by a million mortgage defaults and foreclosures. The 
initial subprime debacle was restricted almost entirely to t he USA; but the wide r 
economic fallout was global. While the volume of sales dropped considerably in 
Australia from mid-2008, house prices showed only modest falls.   
The house price bubble in the USA was very regional and restricted largely to sun-belt 
areas. In Australia also , demand was regional.  Incomes rose most ma rkedly during  
this ‘globa lisation perio d’ in Sydney, Western Australia an d the A.C.T. – but hou se 
prices followed a more complex pattern, as will be discussed in the main report. 
 24
 2 HOUSING TENURE 
Section 1 o f this report  was conce rned with broad market and distrib utional issu es 
affecting th e Australian  housing market and h ousing tenu re. This se ction loo ks at 
some specif ics of the  t enure quest ion in Austr alia, con cluding with a  summary o f 
international policy changes in the last ten years.  
2.1 Changes in tenure in Australia 
The proportions of households in different tenures have remained virtually constant for 
forty years in Australia  – it is pro bably unknown for any other agg regate of such 
intense policy interest to remain virtually fixed for more th an a generation. Table  2 
shows the number of households in the major tenure types for the period. 
Table 2: Numbers of households in different tenures and aggregate home ownership 






with a  
mort-
gage  




Renter  Other 
tenure 




Year  '000  '000  '000  '000  '000  '000  % 
1966 na  na  2 231.9  835.1 59.6 3 126.5  71.4 
1971 na  na  2 468.9  1 001.3  119.3 3 589.5  (b)68.8  
1976 1 306.3  1 437.8  2 761.5  1 044.5  232.5 4 038.5  68.4 
1981 1 548.9  1 542.9  3 178.9  1 164.5  190.6 4 534.0  70.1 
1986 1 981.9  1 604.4  3 586.3  1 334.4  174.1 5 094.8  70.4 
1991 2 362.0  1 561.3  3 923.2  1 560.6  210.3 5 694.2  68.9 
1996 2 658.0  1 656.1  4 314.0  1 866.0  67.8 6 247.8  69 
2001 2 810.9  1 872.1  4 683.0  1 953.1  101.3 6 737.4  69.5 
2006 2 478.3  2 448.2  4 926.5  2 063.9  65.7 7 056.1  69.8 
Note: a) Excludes tenure not stated 
          b) inclusion of  Indigenous households contributed to the fall 
Source: ABS 1301.0 Yearbook Australia 2008 
In the 2005-06 Survey of Income and Housing, 34 per cent of households owned their 
homes outright (i.e. without a mortgage) and 35 per ce nt were owners with a 
mortgage. A further 22 per cent were renting from a privat e landlord a nd 5 per cent 
were renting from a state or territory housing authority. 
The changes in tenure are so small over the p eriod that small changes in definitio n 
can affect t he result. Nevertheless,  it does appear that the proportion of renters rose  
by almost 4 per cent  between 1986 and 1996,  falling back by about 1 per cent a fter 
that time. 
The aggregate figures disguise a change in ownership rates in particular subgroups of 
the population. For example, a number of authors, including Yates (2000, 2002a) and 
Richards (2 008) have pointed out  the fall in  ownership rates in 2 5-39-year-olds, 
dropping from 65 per cent in 1986 to 58 per cent in 2006. In fact, if th e 
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 homeownership rate stays constant, any change in demographics implies an adjusting 
change in homeownership in particular sectors.30  
What does respond to the financial environment is the prop ortion of households with  
mortgages. The proportion of mortgagors fell to historically low levels in the mid-1990s 
following th e banking crisis (F igure 13). 31 Between 1996 an d 2006, the  number o f 
households with a mort gage increased by 50 p er cent, while the numb er of outright 
owners actually fell. Th e proportion  of purcha sers was at  its lowest  level in 1996 at 
26.5 per cent of households, returning almost to 1976 levels by 2006 (34.7 per cent). 
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Source: Housing Occupancy and Costs Survey 2005-6 datacube, ABS Cat.No. 4130.0.55.001 
Figure 14: Loan approvals to first home buyers as a proportion of total approvals 
  
Source: Treasury (2003-4) 
                                                
30 For example, the number of households with a reference person over 55 increased from 22 per cent to 
24.3 per cent in 2001-2006 – and because the older group always has a higher rate of home ownership – 
the home ownership rate in the younger group must fall to balance. 
31 It seems likely that investment advisors also played a considerable role in the increase in home equity, 
since at the ti me, with th e s tock market a nd h ousing market still in th e do ldrums, most advis ers were 
recommending paying off the home mortgage as the best investment strategy. 
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 The census shows tha t the mortga ge recovery took place largely after 2001, but  the 
Housing Occupancy and Costs Survey shows a smoother transition after 1996 (Figure 
14). 
The major f orm of direct assistan ce to home o wnership introduced during the period 
has been the First Home Owners Scheme (FHOS) in 2000  (AIHW 200 8:32) to help  
offset the impact of the GST on construction prices (the grant was n ot restricted  to  
new homes however). F HOS was a non-means-t ested version of similar  schemes i n 
the 1970s and 1980s and, as wit h the earlie r schemes,  it was introduced ju st as 
house price s were beg inning a su stained rise  and contributed to further rises in  
prices.32 A model by Wo od et al. (2003) suggested that while the grant was very 
helpful in improving affordability of entry, the scheme largely caused first home buyers 
to accelerate their purchases. This has been subsequently borne out by the statistics, 
as Figure 14 shows. Following the Grant, first home owner mortgage finance rose to a 
10-year high of over 30  per cent of new housing finance ap provals, but subsequently 
fell back to a record low of under 20 per cent. 
Some statistics support a somewhat later tran sition to  first home ownership, which 
may have b een encouraged by FHOS. For e xample, the Housing Occupancy and  
Costs Survey shows an apparent rise in older  first home owners over 45 (from 5.1 per 
cent to 9.2 per cent in the period 1995-6 to 2005-6).  33 The main target group aged 25 
to 35 has f allen from a maxi mum of 65 per cent of first purchasers in the year of  
introduction of FHOS down to 53 per cent in the rebound years of 2002-3 and 2005-6. 
Also, the proportion of purchasing families with only one income appeared to surge by 
four points in these same years. However, h ousehold in comes of first time buyers 
were apparently unaffected by FHOS, as there was no targeting.  
Finally, these same data show that the proportion of first buyers buyi ng separate  
houses seems to have fallen by a g ood 12 percentage points in the high cost 2005-6  
period, with these buyers of townhouses and  units prob ably causin g the curre nt 
pressure on the rental market. The interest in new dwellings by first home buyers has 
fallen from 23 per cent down to 13 per cent since 1995-6. These issues will be studied 
in more detail in the main project.    
Because fir st home buyers are not such a large component of the  market, the  
Productivity Commission believes that FHOS co uld have ad ded no more than 3 pe r 
cent a year  to house  p rices dur ing a time wh en these w ere rising  b y 15 per ce nt. 
However, they state regarding home ownership:  
‘the case for support  beyond what is already available throu gh the tax system 
is not compelling…Th e mone y in volved coul d yield a hi gher return to the  
community i f redirected to support the broader housing needs of low income 
households’ (Productivity Commission 2004:32). 
 
  
                                                
32 F lood an d Yates (198 7) sho wed that the earli er sche mes were e xtremely regr essive and l argely 
appropriated by h igher i ncome ear ners u ntil me ans testing was bro ught in, which also appeared to  
reduce the im pact on pric es. The Productiv ity Commission (2004) reaches the same c onclusion about 
the present scheme. 
33 ABS Cat. No. 4130.0.5 5.001 - Housing Oc cupancy and Costs, Australi a, 2005-06. Feature datac ube 
First Home Buy ers in Australia. The time series is erratic a nd the a pparent changes fall  well within the 
relative standard error of estimates. 
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 2.2 Private rental and housing investment 
Since 1995 -96, Figure  15 shows that the p roportion of  household s renting fr om 
state/territory housing authorities h as declined  slightly while the prop ortion rentin g 
privately has increased from 19 per cent to 22 per cent. 
Figure 15: Households by tenure and landlord type 
 
Figure 16 shows a percentage breakdown of outstanding home lending by purpose.  
The steady drop off in lending for new housing is apparent – it has fallen from abou t 
27 per cent of the mark et in 1989 to about 10 per cent. However, most obvious is the  
dramatic increase in ref inancing an d in investo r borrowing for estab lished housin g. 
These two proportions are connected – it seems likely that many of these refinancings 
are baby boomers buying investment properties  or other  growth assets for the ir 
retirement.34 The investor percentage peaked at 29 per cent of all borrowings in June 
2007 just before the subprime crisis – but refinancings are still rising pro portionally at 
over 20 per cent of loans in March 2008.  
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Source: RBA Bulletin Table D6. Lending commitments, all lenders. 
                                                
34 This is a fairly nat ural o utcome of incre ased ho usehold income a nd asset ine quality – the ric her 
households can be expected to buy investment properties that the poorer households will live in. 
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 Colebatch (2008) has argued that investors have crowded out new home owners; and 
that private rentals ar e at their present very low level  relative to house prices 
principally for this reason. He also  argues that it is the availability of  negative gearing 
against other forms of income that has encouraged these investors.  
Table 3: Rentals and costs by state, $ per schedule 2005-6 
Location of rental property2 Annual rent 
Annual 
expenses Interest Loss 
      
NSW 10,045 5,238 7534 -26.1% 
VIC 7,865 3,739 5,549 -17.4% 
QLD 8,096 5,197 5,969 -37.2% 
SA  6,476 3,421 4,246 -17.5% 
WA 6,404 3,841 5,356 -40.9% 
TAS 6,268 3,106 3,623 -6.6% 
ACT 9,314 5,664 6,245 -27.4% 
NT  8,106 4,700 5,481 -25.1% 
Total 8,388 4,602 6,177 -27.5% 
Note: The number of schedules is somewhat larger than the number of rental properties 
Source: ATO Taxation Statistics 2005-6, Table 16.  
Negative ge aring is only useful if t he loss claimed can be  recouped against futu re 
capital ga ins, which ar e taxed at a lesser ra te, and ther efore it will tend only to be  
favoured in periods an d places w hen house prices are r ising. Table  3 shows that  
negative gearing is gre atest propo rtionally in Western Australia, Que ensland an d 
Sydney, and lowest in Tasmania, which bears out this assertion. 















Source: Australian Taxation Office. Taxation Statistics 1996-97 to 2005-06 
Figure 17 suggests tha t man y landlords have been victims of rising interest rates  
rather than opportunists cashing in on negative gearing. In t he late 1990s, aggregate 
net rentals in Australia were in fact  positive, a nd turned modestly negative in 20 00-
2001. Losses ballooned in subsequent years. Throughout this period the proportion of 
taxpayers with rental income increased – right through to 2 003-4, and then became 
stationary. New landlords seem to have been motivated by rising house prices rat her 
than the pr ospect of d elaying tax; however, despite the  huge losses on rent al 
properties r ecorded in  2005-06, la ndlords he ld on to  th eir properties. Given the  
subsequent tightening of the rental market it se ems likely that some began to desert  
after this time.    
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 It remains a fact that rents are extremely low – to the point that more than half the rent 
is already going in non-interest expenses, as Table 3 also shows. 
Landlords are hurting – although the govern ment has been absorbing a significant  
proportion of their loss and risk through the tax system. In the event of a housing price 
decline, the  sector ma y be  seriously in trouble. As this is the principal tenure of  
Australia’s low income earners, and many are already paying high proportions of their 
income in rent, an affordability crisis of considerable magnitude is in the offing unless 
the government acts to support supply. 
2.3 Determinants of tenure choice 
A key part of the proposed study and the original relates to determin ants of tenure 
choice, and in fact a great deal of research has been undertaken both in Australia and 
overseas on this issue. 
Yates (2002b, Chapter 5.3 and Appendix C) found that rising inco me, persons 
employed, and various household types were primary determinants of ho me 
ownership. In Chapter 5, she also decomposed the changes in home ow nership from 
1986-96 to show that declining household size and an increase in households with no 
wage inco me was responsible  f or at least  half the d ecline in h ome ownership 
nationally b ut that, pa rticularly in  the regions with rising prices, a decline  in 
affordability was largely responsible for the decline in ownership. Young households 
were typically being excluded. 
In recent years, the emphasis has moved  from cross-sect ional or static studies to  a 
consideration of tenure as a sequence of life cycle choices.35 The recent availability of 
household surveys, including the NLC surv ey, HILDA and  the Housing 21 Survey,  
have made  it possible to undertake a more det ailed exami nation of housing tenur e 
determinants. These have focuse d on attitud es, and on  relationship formation and  
dissolution.  
Wulff (1993) and many others have highlighted the importance of social perceptions in 
determining the preference for home ownership over other tenures. Merlo and 
MacDonald (2002) examined the e xpressed aims and perceptions of 789 non-home  
owners in the NLC s urvey to fi nd the determinants of preferences for home  
ownership. They found that childbirth a spirations, independence and car eer 
aspirations correlated well with home ownership aspirations. In a logit estimation, they 
showed tha t age and  education  were stro ng determinants, but  sex, ethnicity,  
relationship status and employment  status were not. About 31 per cent of those who  
thought that buying a home was important actually achieved this goal in the next three 
years. Success was dependent on the number of workers in the household, income,  
non-English speaking background, and, negatively, on career aspir ations. You ng 
people were less likely to succeed. 
Richards (2008) suggests that the rise in housing expenditure may signify a change in 
preference for housing as incomes have risen, and that housing may be a ‘superior 
good’.36 The recent work by Ben-Sh ahar (2007) also highlights the importance of  
economic factors in explaining tenure c hoice for home  ownership. Interestingly 
                                                
35 The earliest r esearch on life-cycle attainment in housing was undertaken by Hal Kendig (1981, 1984, 
1990). Lim ited work was also u ndertaken for the National Hous ing Strat egy (1 991) us ing th e sp ecial-
purpose HALCS surve y, which was t he first of its kin d to i nvestigate b oth attitu des a nd housing 
outcomes. 
36 A superi or good is o ne on which people spend a h igher proportion of their inc ome as incomes rise. 
However, it is very well known from the l iterature that housing is an inferior good or necessity, so the 
higher expenditure is almost certainly due to a price increase. 
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 though, he suggests th at psychological factor s may be even ‘more meaningful th an 
the economic ones in explaining actual tenure decisions’ (p. 854).  
Flatau et al. (2004) give a major role to house hold formation and dissolution in  tenure 
decisions, modelling the risk of exit from the parental home, deposit requirements and 
transaction costs. 
Beer et al. (2006) highlight the lifecycle component to housing caree rs, finding that 
ownership is closely aligned with lifecycle stag es. They suggest that h ousing careers 
and the pathways that they take are becoming increasin gly varied, nevertheless, 
these pathways are also clearly linke d to lifecycle stages and household structure, for 
example, in  their study marriage di ssolution was the greatest cause of mo ves fro m 
home ownership into rental. Similar to the findings in this study, a recent examination 
of preferences for home ownership in Finland a nd Sweden (Andersson et al. 2007) 
found that p reference for homeownership was strongly lifecycle related, with renting 
‘seen as an  acceptable  alternative for the young, as well as for the elderly. [an d] 
Home ownership … seen as the choice for families with children’ (p. 160). Though the 
preference for home ownership is w ell established to be closely linked to the lifecycle 
stage of marriage, recent work by Lauster and Fransson (2007) suggests th at 
emerging changes in f amily forma tion patte rns have to some extent decreased t he 
importance of marriage as a key lifecycle stage for entry into home ownership.   
Flood (2007) quantifie d both attitudes and  relationship changes in a GL M 
multidimensional analysis of the Housing 21 su rvey, by showing that attitudes are in 
fact the mo st significan t determina nts of tenure – but the se attitudes are already 
heavily conditioned by socioe conomic endowment vari ables. He attempted to  
separate a n attitude index which was mo re indepen dent of the underlying  
endowments, showing that attitude was still the most important variable in determining 
tenure choice, but household type, marital status, income source and education level 
now impacted the result. In part icular, relat ionship bre ak-up and being in less 
permanent relationships were strong determinants of private renting as an alternative  
to ownership.  











Partnered Married Divorced Separated Never
Married
 
Source: Flood (2007) 
For younger household s under 45 , 80 per cent of married persons were hom e 
owners, only around 50 per cent of partnered or divorced persons, and 4 0 per cent of 
separated or never married persons (Figure 18). Flateau et al. (2004, Table 4.2) 
obtained similar results for the HIL DA survey, also showing that remarriage tended to 
recover most of the home ownership share. 
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 Annual divorce rates rose by about 2 per 1000 from 1986 to 1996 for those aged 30 to 
55, 37 but then fell back q uite substantially up to 2006 for persons under 45. From th e 
life cycle te nure analysis it seems very likely th at changes in the rate of relationship 
breakup have also contributed to changes in home o wnership and these will be 
considered in the full study. 
2.4 Tenure neutrality and tenure mix 
For many years a substantial debat e has been conducted in Australia and overseas 
as to whether government policy should be te nure-specific and attempt to help some  
forms of housing tenure at the expense of others.  
There have been several strands to the discussio n, but the economic argument is the 
most common. From an economic point o f view, the que stion u ltimately hinges on 
whether housing is a merit good; 38 and specifically on whethe r home ownership, the 
dominant tenure in Australia, is a merit good that should be specif ically assisted by 
government, given many home owners are relatively affluent.  
A number of European countries ha ve chosen not to assist home ownership above  
other tenures, and some of these countries have quite low home owne rship rates – 
most notably Switzerlan d, which has the highe st per capit a income in Europe an d 
which has a home ownership rate of only 25 per cent.  
The problem is that ho me ownersh ip is alr eady very substantially assisted indirect ly 
through the taxation system in a nu mber of ways that are highly regressive, favourin g 
those with higher inco mes. In Australia, this was originally pointed out in detail by 
Flood and Y ates (1987) and confirmed by subse quent studies such as Flood (1993), 
Productivity Commission (2004) and Abelson (2005). 
It is not in d ispute that home ownership conveys a superior basket of r ights to oth er 
forms of housing tenure. Owners have the right to occupy, modify and dispose of the 
dwelling as they see fit; making full use of the surrounds. They al so obtain a 
substantial investment asset which in Australia has tended to rise almost everywhere  
in the long  term, due to continue d populatio n pressure.  The question is, if home  
ownership is superior,  should not people pay more for it in the long  term rather tha n 
less? 
This simple argument has been  muddied by second-best arguments and by 
externality arguments. The former state that as home ownership is cheaper in the long 
term, partially due to government policy, should not the government help more people 
to get into this more favourable tenure? This kind of assistance is p opular with the  
electorate, but unless it  is carefully designed and means-t ested (which it very rarely 
is), it  can r esult in  extra pressure on house p rices, af fecting cost s fo r most othe r 
tenures, and it can result in payments to people who do not need the assistance . The 
assistance may also result in lower-income households taking on risk that they are il l-
equipped to deal with.  
The externality argume nt says that  general ho me owners hip may ha ve area-wid e 
benefits such as impro ved private i nvestment, better neighbourhoods and security – 
and possibly better environmental outcomes; while on the negative side it may result 
in reduced  labour market and h ousing market mobility, resulting  i n more local 
unemployment and less efficient use of the stock. This may well be the case – but it is 
a fact that such externalities are largely capitalised into land prices because of 
                                                
37 ABS 3307.0.55.001 Divorces, Australia, 2006. This is a roughly a 20 per cent increase in divorce.  
38 A merit good is a commodity which it is considered that an individual or society should have 
on the basis of some norm other than respecting consumer preferences. 
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 inelastic supply, already benefiting local home owners.39 Secondly – there are likely to 
be other means of ach ieving the sa me results which directly address t he issues and 
are much more efficient than indirect home ownership subsidies. Area-wide subsidies 
are notorious for being largely appropriated by higher income groups; and much of the 
literature ha s suggeste d a number of unwanted exclusio nary outcomes from h igh 
concentrations of specific tenures in suburban tracts. 
While tenure neutrality has usually referred to the desirability or otherwi se of assisting 
home ownership more t han other tenures, there have also b een efficiency arguments 
relating to t he social b enefits of maintaining a good mix of tenures, and equity 
arguments relating to assistan ce with high housing cost s for those of other tenures. 
Commonwealth rent assistance  (CRA) began in 1988 in Australia be cause of th e 
desire to provide some assistance to the many low-income families in private rental  
accommodation, and it  has gone  on to be  the largest form of direct housing 
assistance since the  late 1990s, larger  than Common wealth-State Housing  
Agreement expenditure for socia l housing. Re gardless, it has also been generally 
recognised in Australia  that so cial housing  is the preferr ed tenure f or the lowe st 
income groups, combining security of tenure with lowered rentals.  
In Britain, tenure mix has been explicitly recognised as a desirable aim of government 
(partly because of the e xistence of large public housing estates in depressed areas). 
DETR (2000) write : ‘Across all type s of housin g, owned or rented, private or public,  
our policies are intended to deliver improvements in quality and choice’.40 Tunstall and 
Fenton (2006) provide a  good revie w of the ext ensive literature, finding a ‘measured  
optimism’ regarding mixed tenure areas, citing t he considerable benefits to be gained  
from inclusionary policies rather t han exclus ion typically associa ted with specif ic 
tenures.  
2.5 International housing policy responses 
The recent  AHURI re port by Lawson and Milligan (2007) reviews housing an d 
associated social po licies in a nu mber of countries that are economically similar  t o 
Australia. 41 The comparative review examines what shapes both the demand for, and 
supply of, housing (esp ecially affor dable housing) in each nation. In addition, th ey 
survey a  n umber of n ational policy responses aimed a t assisting lower income 
households into home ownership. Lawson and Milligan address three major groups of 
issues which are also at the heart of the present study: 
Æ changes in demographics and restrictions in supply 
Æ house price rises and declining affordability 
Æ policy responses. 
2.5.1 Demographic issues and housing supply 
As in Australia, there was a clea r trend across all nat ions towards decreasin g 
household size, a gro wth in the number of households, and a related increasing  
demand for housing units. This was in some countries offset by stabilisation or falls in 
birth rates or even population levels, taking pressure off the key family housing sector. 
The ageing of populatio ns in developed economies has also acted to tie up housing 
and constrain supply, as households remain in housing that may have originally been 
purchased for a larger household. 
                                                
39 What this means in pr actice is that subsidi es to new home owners which result in thes e externalities 
should be partially recouped by general taxes rather than the usual local taxes that accrue once more to 
the same community.  
40 Munro (2007) regards this as rhetoric unsupported by public opinion.  
41 Austria; B elgium; Ca nada; Denmark; Irel and; F rance; Germany; the  Neth erlands; Ne w Zealand; 
Switzerland; the United Kingdom; the United States. 
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 In many na tions, great er female p articipation in the workforce has increased th e 
income levels of many households by creating double in come households that  are  
characterised by higher incomes and higher borrowing power. Along with falling 
household size, this has tended to create greater inequalities in household incomes. 
In some regions within  the study countries the demographic chan ge has be en 
migration-related, where in-migration to natio ns or to  r egions with in them (fo r 
example, rural to urban  migration in Belgium) has created  increa sed demand, and 
pressure on housing supply.  
Lawson and Milligan’s analysis of new hou sing supply in the Eu ropean study 
countries showed a generalised decline persiste nt over the last quarter century. This 
is notable considering t he corresponding net increase of new households over the  
same period in most, if not all of the nations.  They conclu de that the  ‘lack of ne w 
housing and inelastic supply seems to be a salient problem plaguing housing markets 
in m any countries in th is stu dy’ (p. 50). For the last  twenty-five years  demand-side  
measures have been the preference of the selected national governments, while more 
direct measures, such as housing construction and provision have be come less of a  
focus. Lawson and Milligan suggest that: 
 ‘the demand assistan ce route, which has been favoured by neo-liberal 
governments and inter national ag encies su ch as the OECD and IMF, has  
proved costly and unable to stimulat e supply or  steer broader urban goals’ (p. 
63).  
UN-HABITAT (2001: 100) concurs:  
‘Government support  in the form  of fin ance...is now almost unheard of. 
Government subsidie s for new construction h ave decline d in virtually all  
countries a nd in recent  years there has been  no support  at all from central 
governments including Australia, Canada, the US and the Netherlands.” 
2.5.2 Home ownership and affordability 
While the pr omotion of home owne rship was fo und to be p rioritised by a majority of  
national go vernments included  in  this review, access to home o wnership a nd 
affordability were found to be in decline. 
Owner occupation levels varied significantly among the c ountries in this study, from 
35 per cent in Switzerland to 77 p er cent in Ireland. The level of o wner occupation  
within a co untry is dependent on  a number of direct an d indirect f actors that can 
encourage or prevent households from entering or remaining in ho me owners hip. 
Important among these are: historical or politica l support for home ownership and any 
related assistance or su bsidies available, the treatment of h ome ownership within the 
taxation system, the operation and regulation of the mortgage market, the wider global 
financial market, interest and employment rates, and the affordability of housing in the 
market.  
Affordability and the cost of ho using have a signi ficant influence upon ho me 
ownership levels. Across the nations surveyed, there was a widespread trend towards 
growth in house prices in recent years (p. 41). The revie w shows that not only had 
house prices increased, but that  households were increa singly likely t o be classified  
as being in  housing stress. Canada was a notab le example, having ‘13.6 per cent of 
households…paying over 50 per cent of their disposable in come on housing in 199 9’ 
(p. 42.). Lawson and Milligan make the important point t hat while h ousing stress is 
concentrated in low income households, it is in creasingly beco ming a more  
widespread problem, and is especia lly relevant to younger households who seek to 
enter homeownership. Although problems of affordability a re generally increasin g in 
the countries investigated, there are notable dif ference effects resulting from the w ay 
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 housing is provided and regarded differently  in each country, for example, th e 
presence and character of safety nets, and the size of the socially rented sector.  
The Lawson and Milligan report highlighted consistent a nd relatively rapid rises in  
house prices in the majority of the nations over the last qua rter century. Both demand 
and supply-side factor s, acting se parately and in combination, have fuelled th ese 
rises. Redu ced investment in housing infrastru cture during  the 1980s and 1990s in  
many of  the surveyed c ountries and the prom otion of indir ect assistance models b y 
neo-liberal governments have cont ributed. The United Kingdom is a u seful example, 
having already undergone sign ificant promoti on of home ownership in the de cades 
preceding 2000 (mainly through sales of  so cial hou sing to sitt ing tenants, a nd 
Mortgage I nterest Rate Tax Relief) (Hamne tt 1999). The previously large scale  
transfers of  social housing to own er-occupation through t he Right to Buy scheme  
have tapered signif icantly in recent y ears and they currently have significa nt 
acknowledged problems with affordability (Munro 2007).  
As in Austr alia, there has been a  correspond ing widenin g and dere gulation of  t he 
mortgage finance sector, via a number of mechanisms that have extended the access 
to housing finance to many popul ation group s previously unable to afford home 
purchase. Across the nations it has generally become  easier to obtain mortg age 
credit, and  there are a wider variety of mortgage products available (t his has made 
such cred it available to  many who would have previously been excluded). Of muc h 
recent interest has bee n the se condary mortga ge market t hat has evolved in many 
countries (n otably the US), and the Lawson and Millig an review finds that such 
instruments have been integral to th e increase in home ownership among previously 
excluded groups.  
Further fuelling growth in the mortg age finance  sector has been the ‘ high level o f 
consumer confidence t hat accom panied econ omic growth, increase d incom es and  
employment securit y thr oughout the  1990s’ . This has also been paired  with low or 
falling inter est rates in  man y of t he countrie s examined  over the l ast ten years.  
Together, these factors have driven increased demand from owner occupiers wishing  
to renovate or upgrade, as well as investors and purchaser s of second  homes, an d 
contributed to the increase in house prices.  
2.5.3 Policy responses 
Many of the governments in this study provided strong incentives through the taxation 
system to in vest in home ownership . These incentives, most commonly full or part ial 
tax deductions for mortgage intere st rates, ha ve necessa rily contribu ted to house  
price rises in recent years.  
There has been an emerging focus on the development of alternate and  more mixed 
policy responses to promote home ownership. While promoting home ownership is a 
policy goal of all but two of the countries in this study (Austria a nd German y), 
ownership rates are either low, stalled, or in decline in all countries. Lawson and 
Milligan suggest that housing afford ability is a key reason for this and,  interestingly, 
that often the very prog rams used t o promote home owne rship have contributed to 
high house  prices and  resultant a ffordability problems. Affordability is seen a s a 
significant (and increasing) barrier t o home ownership for  lower income households 
and this ex clusion fro m ownership has the potential to  increase the tenure-based  
wealth gap within many of the  countries examined. Notably, Lawson an d Milligan find 
that: 
 ‘So far, specific policies targeted to lower-income households, such as shared   
equity sche mes and various forms of deposit  gap or mortgage assistance, 
have not turned this situation around in most countries’ (p. 74).  
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 This refers to the recent past, but in the longer term both the United Kingdom and the 
USA ha ve increased o wner-occupation rates.  The United Kingdom has had the 
greatest increase in home ownership rates of any comparable country (Freeman et al. 
1996), with home ownership rate s r ising from 56 per cen t in 1981 to  71 per cen t by 
2000 (Wilcox 1997)42 – similar to the Australian experience 1947 to 1961.  
This has been achieved through a very large scale selloff of public housing through 
the Right to Buy Scheme and other associated programs43, and through various Low 
Cost Home Ownership schemes. These latter include: 
Æ shared equity schemes, including CSO Homebuy and DIYSO (about 90 000 units) 
Æ capital subsidies to developers (GRO) (1400 units in Scotland) 
Æ mortgage rescue schemes (about 2000 households). 
 
The gains in home ownership were unfortunately accompanied by high levels of  
arrears and repossession during the recession a nd housing slump in the early 1990s 
(Bramley and Morgan 1998).  
Another exceptional case is that of the US, where some su ccess had been achieved 
promoting home ownership to  low income and other  targeted groups thro ugh 
mortgage backed securities underpinned by implicit sta te mortgage guarantees – but 
at the cost of mo ving financial risk onto these households which they have been i ll-
equipped to handle and which has flowed on to the who le economic system (se e 
Section 1.6). 
Most of the countries ar e facing very similar housing challe nges to Australia, though  
without the extra pressures of a re source boo m and risin g populatio ns. Across t he 
review nations ‘ no single national h ousing policy stands ou t as exem plary’ (Lawson 
and Milligan 2007:155), but there are many lessons for Australian housi ng policy from 
the many good housing policy initiatives that do exist.  
SECTION SUMMARY 
This section has looked at issues surrounding changes in tenure policy and outcomes 
in Australia and elsewhere from 1986-2006. 
While home ownership is clearly a superior ten ure for families and  tho se on f ixed 
incomes, arguments for subsid ising it have never been con vincing to e conomists. In 
the absence of a sup ply response, housing subsidies, when coupled with loo se 
financial regimes and rising demand, will find their way into elevated house prices and 
rapidly expanding debt. Specific pro grams to improve the home ownership rate for 
lower income groups ha ve rarely been successful and, on o ccasion, have resulted in  
large scale defaults.  
In Australia, despite very substantial government support, home ownership rates have 
not risen since 1961 , and actu ally fell in  1986-1996, especially for younger 
households – probably due to in creased inco me inequality and a h ostile f inancial 
environment. Ownership with a mort gage fell from 35 per ce nt in 1981 to 26 per cent  
in 1996, but has since r eturned to the higher levels. This has been accompanied by a 
very substantial growth  in ref inancing and in household debt, suppo rted by more 
flexible lending practices and falling interest rates. 
                                                
42 In Engla nd th e rate actua lly peake d at 75  per c ent in 1981, b efore th e Thatcherite progr ams took  
effect. Home o wnership fe ll i n abs olute and perce ntage terms after 200 5. As in Australia, it h as be en 
claimed that w ould-be hom e o wners hav e bee n price d out of the market b y pr ospective l andlords. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7242492.stm  
43 1.8 million dwellings were transferred to sitting tenants between 1981 and 1994 with discounts of up to 
70 p er cent of  market valu e (Bramley a nd Morgan 19 98). About 1 3 per  cent  of hom e o wners are i n 
dwellings that were formerly publicly owned (Munro 2007). 
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 Loans to investors have provided an important countercyclical investment vehicle and 
rose to almost 30 per cent of all loans in 2004, falling away rapidly in the current crisis. 
This investment provided an important cushion  for rents and diverted a portion of t he 
stock to ren tal tenure and smaller dwellings in  line with changing demand. Howe ver, 
after 2001, higher housing price s h ad become out of bala nce relative t o rents and  
most landlords were taking losses. These losses ballooned after 2005 to the point that 
they have become a significant drain on taxation revenue.  
The availability of longitudinal surveys has encouraged a re-examination  of the effect  
of demographic change and household attitudes on the question of tenure choice. An 
ageing pop ulation, marital breakdo wn, and ch anging hou sehold size  are sign ificant 
contributors to tenure  outcomes,  and they must be allowed for in determining 
‘underlying’ changes in ownership levels due to affordabilit y and finan ce availabilit y. 
These will be explored in the final report. 
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 3 MARKETS AND SUPPLY ISSUES 
3.1 Fast versus slow – money supply or physical supply? 
In a market, prices will rise when dem and exceeds supply. There are two lines of 
thought reg arding rapidly rising  house price s. The first, typically supported by 
macroeconomists such as the Reserve Bank and the Productivity Commission, states 
that supply is largely inelastic and can only be  supplemented very slowly, and it is the 
cost and supply of housing finan ce that larg ely determines price r ises. This was 
discussed in Section 1.5.  
The second argument, usually favoured by  housing and lan d economists and by th e 
residential building ind ustry, says that ultimately house prices are determined by 
housing supply constraints, and tha t these are largely engineered by local and st ate 
governments through r estrictions on the su pply of land, t hrough excessive plan ning 
regulation, and by taxes on land development and residential construction.  
This latter a pproach is very old an d is intuitive ly attractive – surely the price of ne w 
housing at the periphery, at least, must be de termined by these constraints, an d 
ultimately t he whole market mu st be proportionally affected by t hese marginal  
additions.  
The Housing Industry Associat ion in particular has strongly lobbied against a numb er 
of changes to planning rules and charges that  it believes have disadvantaged ne w 
peripheral housing and have caused its price t o rise. These are the slow release of  
land due to urban planning restrictio ns; general taxes on housing, inclu ding GST and 
stamp duty;  and devel oper charges for phys ical and so cial infrastr ucture on new 
developments – which, before 1980 or so, were  borne from general revenue but now 
which are entirely placed on developers.  
The Productivity Commission (2004, Figure 6.4) states that the HIA assertions on land 
and supply shortage ar e correct fo r some citie s, but not f or others. I n Sydney, f or 
example, which contin ues to suffer from ch ronic land shortage due to natural 
constraints, the supply of greenfie ld sites dipped substa ntially in 19 95-1997, and  
again after 2000. However, the sup ply of lots in  Melbourne increased somewhat after 
1999. In NSW and Queensland, there appears to be a long-term supply shortfall,  
which is not  large, representing abo ut 5 per cent of underlying demand in NSW ove r 
the period 1996-2003 and 10 per cent in Queensland. B oth states h ave had ve ry 
substantial rises in hou se prices at  different times in the cycle, and the lack of an 
adequate supply response has definitely contributed to high prices during any 
prolonged surge in demand. Supply and demand are broadly in balance elsewhere.   
Developer charges appear to be arbitrary and unrelated to actual infrastructure co sts, 
according t o Urbis JHD (2006), who write: ‘New houses in Sydn ey incur to tal 
infrastructure charges of $68,233 compared to an actual direct infra structure co st 
estimate of $1,752 – a difference of over $66,000’. This eff ectively taxes new ho me 
buyers for services be nefiting the  broader communit y – the opposite to what 
happened in the past  when the general taxpayer bore the infra structure co sts. 
Infrastructure charges are conside rably less in Melbourne and Brisbane, but still  
exceed the actual cost of provision. 
However, while the assertions of the HIA are broad ly correct in Sydney and 
Melbourne at least, t he question is whether these costs are actually passed on to the 




 Up till 1973  or so, the  majority of housing sa les in Austr alia were in  fact for ne wly 
constructed housing, and more than  half of these were for first-time home buyers. In 
those days, supply bottlenecks such as materials and labour shortages were crucial in 
determining housing pr ices. Howe ver, from th at time new housing h as become a  
smaller and smaller part of market turnover (currently about 11 per cent of sales 
nationally),44   and first-time buyers have increasingly tende d to purcha se existing  
homes. Therefore, peripheral additio ns cannot be said to drive the mark et, at least in 
the shorter term. In fact Abelson (2005) argues that the reverse is now true:  
‘The Housing Industry Associat ion contends that new home buye rs are 
‘inappropriately facing massive bills for upfront contributi ons to soci al and 
community infrastructure’ as well as GST and stamp duties and th at the  
taxation of housing is ‘impactin g severely on housin g affordability’. The 
implication is that  all su ch taxes on  new house s are pa ssed forward t o the 
consumer. This would occur only if the demand for new housing were perfectly 
inelastic an d supply pe rfectly elastic.  Market conditions f or new housing are  
almost the exact opposite of this’.  
Abelson go es on to sa y that, in the circumsta nces, any charges on new housin g 
cannot be passed on to  the consumer, but instead must be borne by the builder a nd 
developer. This will eff ectively come off the price of raw land, which normally h as a  
very substantial mark-up against raw agricultural land, because of anticipated profits 
from de velopment for owner occupation. Accordingly, all these ch arges do not  
increase the price of ho using, but rather lower the price of land. A natural corollary of 
this would be that, in the past, failure to charge f ull costs for government contributions 
to develop ment was  largely appropriated as a subsidy by landowners and land  
speculators in advance of the actual development. 
However, th is argument , which e ssentially says that supply does not  matter very 
much, goes against ma ny decades of com parative study in urban economics – f or 
example, Quigley and Raphael (2 005), Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks ( 2005a, 200 5b, 
2006). Different rates of housing affordability in different  cities and  countries are 
usually attributed to bot tlenecks in the supply o f land (Ang el 2000). A belson (1991) 
attributed long-term structural differences in the price of housing in Sydney compared  
with other capital cit ies to be largely due to hilly terrain and constraint s on expansion, 
and Richards (2008) follows the same theme.  
The most common co mparative international  measure of affordabilit y is the ho use 
price-to –in come ratio, which divides the median price of housing by median gross  
annual household income. If this ratio is 3 or less, the housing market is regarded as  
extremely ef fective with little government interference; if it is around 6 the market i s 
regarded as tight and inefficient with  poor land supply; and higher values (such as in  
former socialist countries) are considered to  be the o utcome of gross market 
distortions or very serious restrictions on urban growth.45 
 
  
                                                
44 In terms of home purc hase finance for o wner-occupation, ABS Cat No 5609. Housing F inance 
Australia. April 2008. Acc ording to ABS Cat.No.4102.0, Social Trends 2003, about 14 per cent of FHOS 
recipients bought a new dwelling, although the grant was higher than for established dwellings. Also see 
Section 2.1. 
45 See Figure 9 for recent international comparisons. 
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 Figure 19: House price to income ratios, Australia 1986-2006 
 
Source: Kryger 2006 
On this basis, one wou ld be forgiv en for assu ming from Figure 19 t hat Australia’s 
housing supply situation had moved from a larg ely unrestricted land supply situation 
to an extremely tight and restricte d situation . This is precisely what t he HIA have 
claimed. However, exce pt in Sydney, there is n o evidence t hat since 1998 when the 
price-to-income ratio broke out from historical levels, land supply ha s become a ny 
more restrictive or rationed than it was before this time. As we have seen in Section  
1.5, the mo ve in price s was in  fact  away from long-term equilibrium determined by 
supply, and was occasioned by an expansion in debt and the money supply.  
That the recent rise in average house prices has not a great deal to do with supply i s 
shown in Figure 20. Here we see that established house prices ha ve more  th an 
trebled over 20 years, whereas the cost of project homes has risen by only 150 per 
cent, and materials costs by less than the rate of inflation.  
However, it would be wrong to say t hat policies aimed at increasing housing supply or 
reducing the costs of n ew housing are no long er relevant in a market dominated by 
established housing turnover. What we are seeing in urban housing markets are fa st 
and slow processes wo rking together, and to ignore the slow processes of supply is  
asking for trouble in the long term. 
Figure 20: Price indices for established houses, project homes and building materials, 
1987-2003 
 Source. ABS Cat. No 4102.0. Social Trends 2004. 
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 The change in the stock is rarely mo re than 2 per cent annu ally (compared with a 4.5  
per cent average turnover), so tha t suppl y normally adjusts very slowly to  exces s 
demand. Supply effectively acts as a constraint or trajectory against which fast moving 
demand changes – responding to finance, house hold income, and dema nd policies – 
operate. Demand ‘bumps again st’ supply as it  moves rapidly, and in the very long 
term equilibrium will occur. Over a lengthy period of time, slow additions will mount up, 
so that eventually, persistent add ed costs of  supply will flow throu gh the hou sing 
system.  
While short er term price increases ma y ha ve little to do with supply, the re verse 
should definitely be the case (Richards 2008). The lack of responsiveness of supply to 
much higher house prices is indicative of an extreme ‘stickine ss’ in  the market, 
preventing new housing from co ming online t o take pressure off the overheating  
market.46  
3.2 Price gradients, urban densities, and changes in 
planning regimes 
Throughout the 1980s a nd 1990s, p articularly d uring the te nure of Federal Ministe r 
Brian Howe  in 1983-1996, a spirited debate took place  between environmental 
advocates who wished to see smaller footprints for Aust ralia’s cities, local plan ners 
concerned with lack o f social mix, ballooning infrastruct ure costs on the urban 
boundaries, and shrinking population densitie s in middle -ring subur bs, and ho me 
ownership a dvocates who believed that Austra lia had bee n founded on an ideal of  
limitless lan d and a dream of ho me owners hip on a qu arter acre block (see Tro y 
1996).  
There is no doubt that, due to shrinking household size, a mismatch began to open up 
between the housing sto ck and the requirements of family structure. In particular, the 
rapid growth in single person households required a fairly major redevelopment of the 
stock in favour of smaller dwellings, while the considerable bulk of  th e stock was 
designed fo r the ever-shrinking pro portion of n uclear families. From th e mid-1980s,  
weakening of the powers of local g overnment t o restrict de velopment, coupled wit h 
pro-active policie s by the state s encourag ing mixed or medium density in fill 
development, have led to an increase in urban d ensities, particularly towards the city 
centre. 
For the who le downwave, urban lan d price gradients continued to st eepen, which is 
very apparent in Figure 21 for Melbourne. The situation is similar in other cities.   
                                                
46 Part of the pr oblem is that l and rather than improvements appreciates in value, and conversion from 
other land uses is not necessarily more profitable as prices rise. Price rises at the  periphery are already 
partly anticipated by speculative land values.  
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 Figure 21: Change in Urban price gradient, Melbourne 1992-2002 (Nepean highway line) 
 
Source: Productivity Commission (2004), Figure 6.2b 
There are several reasons why this has happened: 
Æ Increasing household income inequality has increased the value of time for high 
income households and led them to gentrify inner areas, bidding up prices. 
Æ Two-income families have a natural tendency to locate cen trally, as both partners 
need to be close to work. The proportion of these families continues to  increase 
and they have been major drivers of residential differentiation (Flood 2000b). 
Æ Infill policies have incre ased densiti es in inner areas, which places pressure on 
land prices. 
Fairly obviously, a steepening land price gradient will result in a substantial increase in 
average house price s. However – growing cities can a lmost always be expected to 
have higher prices, whether this happens by increasing densities or by e xpanding the 
boundary. Whenever the city boun dary expands, average house prices will r ise in the 
long term –  because  fr om standard urban economics th e price  of housing at  the 
centre of th e city must be at least equal to the  cost at the boundary plus (increase d) 
transport costs to the centre.  
So the question is – if the population expands, which strategy will result in the greatest 
increase in prices – expanding the city boundary or increasin g densities (of dwellings 
or people)?  Theoretical ly – creatin g a shortag e of anything will always increa se i ts 
price in an open market more than the congest ion costs of allowing supply to expand 
naturally. The empirical result is also unequivocal – putting a green belt or other majo r 
land constraint around a city can typically be expected to dou ble prices inside the belt 
(Angel 2000).  
Increasing land prices does not ne cessarily mean that aff ordability wil l be affecte d – 
as long  as the average amount of land  p er dwelling  decrease s to match.  The  
Productivity Commission (2004, p123) writes:  
‘Urban consolidation policies that introduce constraints on fringe development, 
including through ‘urban growth boundaries’, are likely to increase the scarcity 
value of land. Their effects on hou sing afforda bility depend on the scope to  
increase housing densities’. 
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 SECTION SUMMARY 
This section has dealt with supply and with urban spatial issues in relation to house  
price change and tenure choice.  
Declining or stationary supply has accompanied the recent very large run-up in house 
prices almost everywh ere in the OECD, and  this has e ncouraged industry lobb y 
groups to pr ess for re forms in the la nd development process. Stringent planning and 
environmental regulations, slow rates of land release, and rising levels of developer 
contributions, have lon g been a fe ature of the  urban syst em, and these have be en 
targeted as a significant  cause of the present housing bubb le, where the governme nt 
may take action.  
Urban economics shows that expa nding urban boundaries, increased densities, and 
increasing inequality will all con tribute to high er average land and h ousing prices, 
while the latter two will cause steeper urban price gradients. However, Reserve Bank 
and academic economists have not supported the supply argument, stating that n ew 
supply in any year is too limited to make much difference and that new dwelling prices 
at the periphery have  not risen  rapidly. We have sugg ested that slow and f ast 
processes are both at work and that , in the long  run, restrict ions in supply will always 
manifest th emselves in higher prices which may be exacerbated by rapid money 
growth. 
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 4 ISSUES AND RESEARCH OUTLINE 
4.1 Overview 
What this concept pap er has atte mpted to address is th e difference s in the  bro ad 
economic and social en vironment for housing 1996-2006 from the peri od 1986-1996 
covered by Judy Yates (2002a, b) in her original study of changes in housing tenure. It 
has also briefly reviewe d a range of issues not  covered by Yates, most specificall y 
related to research in  housing finance, life cycle considerations, t enure choice , 
planning regimes, land price gradients, and house prices and costs. 
It has taken the view that the period 1974-2003 was a Kondratieff downwave in whi ch 
economic growth was slow and very errati c, the demand for capital and resources as 
expressed by interest rates, wages and resource prices was falling , income and  
wealth inequality increased rapidly due to lack of demand f or labour, and the only real  
pressure on housing markets took the form of occasional booms and bubbles from the 
unstable financial situation. 
We now consider that  we have  moved into a very diff erent era of steady an d 
increasing pressure on capital and resources, and that Australia is particularly 
affected as a supplier of raw materials and  some e xpertise to the new sup er-
economies. Essentially, planners an d housing  p rofessionals have had it easy for a 
long time, with a lot of s lack in the system, but that is changing. Imbalances will no 
longer be caused by artificia l flows of intangibles but by ge nuine underlying resource 
shortages. Labour markets and ho using markets are tighte ning. Interest rates will be 
relatively high to hold  down excessive gr owth, demand and inflat ion; there will be 
pressures on supply, on building lab our, materials and land – something that has no t 
been seen for a generation.  
The study period 1996-2006 is transitional. It has already shown  man y of t he 
characteristics of an emergent upwave, but it has retained the policies and attitudes of 
the previous era. A first pass through the tenure data shows that tenure patterns have 
been fairly stable. The  imbalance in outright  ownership versus mo rtgage finan ce 
identified b y Yates and due to t he banking  crisis of t he early 1990s has be en 
corrected with a reversion to long-term levels of approximate equality in proportions of 
owners and  purchasers. In fact,  t he recovery has overshot to reco rd levels of  
household indebtedness, and hou se prices w hich are way above h istorical tre nd 
levels, with regard to either incomes or rents.  
The report has identified and briefly examined six possible causes of ballooning house 
prices from 1996-2006:  
1. excessive growth in the money supply 
2. liberalised lending practices 
3. large-scale purchase of investment  properties, presumably b y bab y boomers 
seeking retirement incomes 
4. rising incomes 
5. restricted housing supply 
6. government incentives, such as the First Home Owners Scheme. 
Correcting this overshoot is a challenge that Australia has not faced before, but which 
the RBA has explicit ly tackled.  The  Reserv e Bank of Aust ralia clearly regards th e 
house price boom as the major threat to financial stability, and has undertaken a large 
number of research studies. For several years the RBA attempted to take the heat out 
of the market through interest rate rises. Durin g the first phase of subprime made on-
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 market purchases of mortgage-backed securit ies in an at tempt to strengthen this  
market. Now in line with other OECD countries, in the wake of the subprime crisis they 
have had  t o reverse d ramatically their contra ctionary policies by drop ping intere st 
rates rapidly, while the  governmen t has issued substant ial deficit spending in  a jn 
attaempt to soften the credit squeeze. 
Both the contractionary and expan sionary policies have been quite recent and have  
not yet flowed through into signif icant changes in tenure patterns, where we have still  
been seein g the tail e nd of the  a ctivities of  t he last  thirt y years. Although home  
ownership rates stayed constant d uring the st udy period as they have done for the  
past 35 yea rs, home o wnership rates have fallen in young er households, and ma ny 
commentators believe t hat this will result in a longer-term drop in ho me ownershi p 
rates. The supply of ne w housing has not responded to th e higher prices; and supply 
remains below effective demand in some locations, especially Sydney.  
By comparison with incomes, and especially in comparison with house prices, rents  
have stayed remarkably low, which has assisted low-income households. It appears 
that this is largely due to the investment h ousing boo m – but it is also due  t o 
continually rising prices and to negative gearing, which have  encouraged landlords to 
accept net r ental rates of return that are at unprecedented ly low level s. These lo w 
rents have encouraged the growing proportions of private rental tenure amo ng 
younger households. During the rises in interest rates and the tightening of the money 
supply in early 2008, rental vacancy rates fell to extremely low levels and the now the 
effects of looming recession remain uncertain. 
4.2 Research issues and questions  
The purpose of this project is to  look in detail at changes in housing tenu re 
(specifically, home ownership) from 1996, as shown in the  2006 census. As well as 
looking at changes in tenure rates by region, age and employment st atus as Yates 
(2002b) has done, it is our intention to look at changes due to marital status and at the 
effect of house price changes as far as is possible – although the latter have changed 
so rapidly that the effects have yet to pass through the system 
The questions the project seeks to answer are, for the decade 1996-2006: 
Æ What was the change in home ownership rate s for different  regions, age cohorts, 
household types and categories of employment status? 
Æ How does the change in income distribution compare with the previous decade, 
and what effect has this had on rates of home ownership? 
Æ What effect do housing prices have on home ownership, for different groups? 
Æ Have the determinants of home ownership changed since 1996? 
Æ This review has provided some partial answers for these questions. 
Æ Overall, home ownership has continued to stay steady as it has done for 40 years. 
However, t he numbers of purch asers with  a mortga ge has increased very 
substantially, and so  ha s househo ld indebtedn ess. The  pr oject will lo ok at t he 
detailed ch anges usin g the main data set and by access to oth er Census 
products. The flowthrough of young er age cohorts previously considered to be a t 
risk will be of interest. 
Æ Incomes increased quit e rapidly over the period, but more  for the top  income  
group. Income inequality increased,  but much less than it did in the pr evious ten 
years. This result is expected to vary somewhat by region.  
Æ House prices have changed very rapidly almost everywhere. This does not appear 
to have det erred would-be buyers as finance has been freely available (which is 
precisely the cause of t he price increase). So far rents have not followe d suit, but  
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 rental short ages have become very apparent. Project h omes at the periphery 
remain comparatively affordable, th ough increasingly distant from the city centre. 
A bursting of the bubble would have deleterious effects that could  last for a  
considerable time. Ri sing petrol prices an d mortgage  rates have lowered 
disposable incomes for many house holds, but while labour  markets remain tigh t 
and wages continue to rise, difficulties in market entry are not really apparent.  
Æ Life cycle a nalysis has revealed that relation ship changes and attitudes are key 
determinants of tenure choice. We have included the former in our endowments  
for analysis. 
4.3 Research methodology 
The project  essentially follows the methodology of Yates ( 2002b). It consists of a n 
analysis of housing tenure outcomes at a  regional level, to see to what e xtent 
household characteristics su ch as age of household ref erence person, number of  
workers, income, marital status, and household size and type have on t enure choice. 
To do this, it  compares two large cross-cla ssified census tables of households at ten-
year intervals (1996 and 2006 in this case), made as similar as possible and adjusted 
for missing values. For this purpose, 8-way special cross-classifications of households 
for the 1996 and 2006 Census have been obtained. The 2006 Table is described  in 
Appendix A; it is generally similar to that obtained by Yates f or 1986 and  1996, but it  
includes several extra age categories, plus a classification of marital status.  
The analysis proceeds through a shift-share a nalysis to lo ok at region al changes in 
household i ncome controlling for age and household type. Change in tenure is  
examined in the same way, controlling for age, household type and marital status; and 
also u sing a log it model which est imates both the determinants of  ho me 
ownership/rental and the determinants of ch ange in home owners hip during t he 
period.  
Yates identified the necessity to estimate missing values for income as these varied in 
a systematic way with t he number of income earners, resu lting in possible errors in  
tenure estimates. We propose to do this using pro-rata entropy-maxi misation 
methods, which are very similar and more direct.  
If time and data permit, we also intend to conduct a partial analysis of the effects of 
changes in price on tenure choice. This is not easy in Australia, becau se this type o f 
study is data-intensive, requiring a special purpose survey. The Survey of Income and 
Housing Costs in fa ct has the data  required, b ut confidentiality requirements do not  
allow for the accurate spatial iden tification of  respondents which is necessary to 
estimate local land prices.  
At present,  the 2006  cross-classification table  described in Appendix 1 has bee n 
obtained and is under p reliminary examination. The BLOGI T program has also b een 
purchased, along wit h software  to est imate missin g values using entr opy 
maximisation. 
 46
 APPENDIX: THE DATA SET 
The major data source for the proj ect is a special matrix cross-tabulation from th e 
Australian Census for Population and Housing for 2006, constructed to be compatible 
wherever possible  with  two simila r cross-ta bulations for  the 1986  and the 19 96 
Census by Yates (2002 ). Some ext ra categorie s have been included  t o investigat e 
some key issues ident ified by Yates in her 2 002 study, and an extra variable o n 
Marital Status has been added, because of results on ten ure choice by Flood (2 007) 
and others, which showed this to be a very significant determinant of tenure choice. 
The table counts Australian households with in private occupied dwellings, excluding 
households who ha ve visitors (from o verseas or within Australia) as the reference 
person, and all non-family households.  
Cross-tabulations are limited by ABS software to about  five million cells. ABS 
randomises small cells, stating ‘No r eliance should be pla ced on small cells as th ey 
are impacted by rand om adjustment, respondent and processing e rrors…When 
calculating proportions, percentag es or ratio s from cross-classified or small ar ea 
tables, the random error introduced can be ignored except when very s mall cells are 
involved, in which case the impact on perce ntages and  ratios ca n be signif icant’. 
Therefore, it is wise to limit the number of variables and th e number of categories in  
each variable, to prevent these errors being promulgated during analysis. 
This study follows and  extends Yates (2002b ) in obtain ing a table which cross-
classifies Geographical Area (23 categories), Household Income (10 categories), Ag e 
(7 categories), Tenure (7 categories), Marital St atus (5x2 categories), Household type 
(6 categories), Number of children (2 categories), Persons employed (3 categories).  
A.1 Spatial regions for the study  
In the smaller states,  regions were capital city/rest o f state. Fo r Sydne y and 
Melbourne, statistical sub-divisions were aggre gated to form inner, middle and outer  
rings; while  Brisbane was divided into an inner and an outer ring. In New South 
Wales, thre e extra regions were added – Hunter, Illawar ra and North Coast. T he 
statistical sub-divisions or statistical regions included in these definitions are indicate d 
in Table 4 
Table 4: Regions in ABS data set (23 zones) 
NSW (7 zones)  
 
Metropolitan (1 Inner, 2 Middle, 3 Outer) 
Inner Sydney (SSD) 1  
Eastern Suburbs (SSD) 1  
Inner Western Sydney (SSD) 1  
Lower Northern Sydney (SSD) 1  
St George Sutherland (SSD) 2 
Canterbury-Bankstown (SSD) 2  
Central Western Sydney (SSD) 2  
Blacktown (SSD) 2  
Central Northern Sydney (SSD) 2 
Northern Beaches (SSD) 2  
Fairfield-Liverpool (SSD) 3  
Outer South Western Sydney (SSD) 3  
Outer Western Sydney (SSD) 3  
VICTORIA (4 zones) 
 
Metropolitan (1 Inner, 2 Middle, 3 Outer) 
Inner Melbourne (SSD) 1 
Southern Melbourne (SSD) 1 
Boroondara City (SSD) 1 
Western Melbourne (SSD) 2 
Moreland City (SSD) 2 
Northern Middle Melbourne (SSD) 2 
Eastern Middle Melbourne (SSD) 2 
Greater Dandenong City (SSD) 2 
Eastern Outer Melbourne (SSD) 2 
Yarra Ranges Shire Part A (SSD) 3 
Melton-Wyndham (SSD) 3 
South Eastern Outer Melbourne (SSD) 3 
Hume City (SSD) 3 
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 Gosford-Wyong (SSD) 3  
 
NSW non-metropolitan  
4 Hunter SR  
5 Illawarra SR 
6 Mid-North Coast SR 
7 Rest of NSW 
 
Northern Outer Melbourne (SSD) 3 
Frankston City (SSD) 3 
Mornington Peninsula Shire (SSD) 3 
 
4 VIC non-metropolitan/ Rest of Victoria 
 
QUEENSLAND 3 zones 
1 Brisbane City Inner Ring  
SR - City Core  
SR: E & S Inner  
SR: N & W  
2 Brisbane City Outer Ring  
SR: E & S  
SR: N & W  
South and East BSD Balance SR 
North and West BSD Balance SR  
Ipswich city 
3 Queensland non-metropolitan/Rest of QLD  
 
WA 2 zones 
 
1 Metropolitan  
Central Metropolitan (SSD) 
East Metropolitan (SSD) 
Inner North Metropolitan (SSD) 
Outer South West Metropolitan (SSD) 
Outer South East Metropolitan (SSD) 
2 Western Australia non-metropolitan/Rest of 
WA 
 
SA 2 zones 
1 South Australia metropolitan  
Northern (SSD)  
Western (SSD) 
Eastern (SSD)  
Southern (SA SSD) 
2 Rest of SA 
 
TAS 2 zones 
1 Tasm ania metropolita n – Greate r Hobart 
(SD) 
2 Tasmania non-metropolitan/Rest of TAS 
 
NT 2 zones 
1 NT Metropolitan – Darwin (SD) 
2 NT non-metropolitan – Rest of NT 
 
Australian Capital Territory 
 
This is not a complete enumeration of Australia as the smaller territories are excluded.  
The inner zones (cod e 1) in both Sydne y and Melbourne, contain ing statist ical 
subdivision within ten kilometres of the city centre, have the highe st populat ion 
densities. 
The outer zones (cod e 3), conta ining stat istical sub-d ivisions rou ghly 25 to 30  
kilometres f rom the centre, have the lowest p opulation d ensities and  the greate st 
supply of land available for resident ial development. Yates calculated the inner and 
outer zones to contain just over a quarter of the city population in 1996. 
In New South Wales, the Hunter an d Illawarra regions are centred on Newcastle an d 
Wollongong, respectively, and represent two ‘old economy’ regions. The Mid-No rth 
Coast region contains t he expanding Coffs Harbor and Port Macquarie urban regions  




 A.2 Income data (10 categories) 
Gross household income is the preferred meas ure of income used in housing market 
studies. Yat es (2002) used more  or less the same income categories (inflatio n 
adjusted) in  1986 and 1986, to represent approximate qu intiles of th e household  
income distribution, and  we ha ve endeavoured to do the s ame in 200 6. Because of  
changes in the income distribution we have  used different multipliers to define the  
boundaries of each income group. 
Table 5: Income boundaries and means 1996 and 2006 






Actual 2 006 
categories 
Low income 0-299 1.328 0-399 0-349 plus 1/3 of 
350-499 
Low-mod income 300-499 1.340 400-669 500-649 plus 2/3 
of 350-499 
Moderate income 500-799 1.339 670-1049 650-999 
Mod-high income 800-1199 1.313 1050-1674 1000-1699 
High income 1200+ 1.397 1675+ 1700+ 
* derived from 2005-06 and 1995-96 Household Expenditure Survey (ABS Cat. 6523.0)47 
Unfortunately, the actua l income ca tegories used in the 2 006 survey do not match 
these adjusted limits well in the two critical categories of lowest income. Therefore, we 
asked for an extra cat egory and divided it between the two quintiles, as the last 
column of Table 5 shows. 









Partial or not given 
Because of the difficulties and biases reported by Yates, we have also  included the  
categories 1, 2, and 9 and 10 of misreported or partially reported income.  
 
A.3 Age of reference person (7 categories) 
As with Yat es (2002), the age data used in this report refers to the age of th e 
reference person in the household.  Because o f Yates’ (200 2b, Chapter 5) emphasis 
on the ‘critical formation years’ we select ed age categories in five-year i ntervals from 
25 to 45 years of age:  
 
1. 0-24 years 
2. 25-29 years 
3. 30-34 yrs 
4. 35-39 yrs 
5. 40-44 yrs 
                                                
47 Household Expenditure Surveys used equivalised scales (adjusted for family type) in 1996-2006, but 
as we are only se eking ap proximate rati os for the quintiles here, this should n ot make a sign ificant 
difference.  
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 6. 45-64 years 
7. Over 65 
 
A.4 Tenure data (7 categories) 
In the 200 6 Census, there were separate variables for  Tenure (TEND) and f or 
Landlord type (LLDD). In order to obtain the u sual tenure categories, we requested 
the following: 
1. Outright owners (TEND=1) 
2. Owner purchasers (TEND=2 and 3) 
3. Private renters (TEND = 4, LLDD = 10, 31, 32 
4. Social renters (TEND = 4, LLDD = 20, 60) 
5. Other renters (TEND = 4, LLDD = 40, 51, 52, &&) 
6. Other (TEND = 5,6,7) 
7. Not stated (TEND=&, @) 
Owner purchasers include those under a rent-t o-buy scheme. Pri vate renters include 
those renting from an e state agent  or someone not in  the household. Social renters 
include pu blic and communit y renters. Other renters include e mployees and 
residential parks. Other includes rent free, life tenure, and other tenure type. 
 
A.5 Household categories (5 categories) 
The results are presented for the four major h ousehold types in Australia: couple s, 
couples wit h children; single perso ns and sole  parents. A s with Yates (2002b), all 
other house holds, such  as group or multiple family households, are  included in  a  
catch-all ’ot her’ categor y. Visitor-on ly househol ds and no n-private dwellings (hote ls 
and institutions) are excluded from the count. 
 
A.6 Marital Status (5x2 categories) 
A number of survey studies have revealed that persons who have recently established 
or discont inued a relationship are considerably more likely to be renters (see th e 
discussion in Section 2.1). We therefore have added a variable on marital status. 
Because of the increasing number of de-facto relationsh ips, the 2006 Census  
distinguishes two kinds of marital status, Registered marital status (MSTP) and Social 
marital status (MDCP). We asked for the following categories of MSTP:  





cross-classified by 2 categories of MDCP (De-facto and n ot). It would have bee n 




 A.7 Household type (five categories) 
Although the variables and categories that define household type have changed, ABS 
were able to construct an equivalent composite to Yates, for single family households: 
couples, co uples with children, sin gle persons, sole parents and a catch-all ‘oth er’ 
category for group and multiple family households.  
 
A.8 Large and small households 
Part of the  original Yates modelling was to include a proxy varia ble for ‘large’  
households – ones with more than two children of any age; the argument being tha t 
these households nee ded more than two bedrooms. The flag for these larg e 
households turned out to be very significant in the model, therefore we have includ ed 
it.  
 
A.9 Number of persons employed 
Yates included a simple count of persons employed full or p art-time in the household  
(restricted to three categories, being 0, 1, 2 or more employed persons) as a proxy for 
several things: 
Æ households where no-one is employed are us ually eit her ‘retired’ or largely 
supported by welfare payments 
Æ many studies have reve aled the extra pur chasing power and increased  likelihood 
of ownership among multiple income families 
Æ Yates also reported a statistical bias in that households with multiple income  
earners were more likely to report ‘partial’ results or to under-report incomes. 
For these same reaso ns, we have include d this variable. Like  Yates we have 
excluded vi sitors from the count, but unlike Yates we have included residents tha t 
were absent on census night. 
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